Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables

Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild

Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Sudan: these and other civil wars have posed seemingly intractable challenges to policymakers, scholars, and human rights groups seeking to put an end to such deadly conflicts. In the wake of negotiated settlements to civil wars, one of the thorniest problems involves reassuring people who have been "killing one another with considerable enthusiasm and success" that conflict is not about to break out again, endangering people's lives.[1] Those concerned with the implementation and ultimate success of negotiated settlements have debated how best to enhance the prospects of a stable peace. What arrangements, if any, can be used to persuade communities that intergroup relations will take place in a climate of relative security? Are there any mechanisms the international community might employ to discourage the resumption of violence? Is an enduring peace settlement more likely in certain environments than in others? In this research note we explore variables that help to explain the longevity of negotiated peace settlements.

Analysts and policymakers interested in helping to foster a stable peace have focused on such variables as the international arena, institutional choice, the characteristics of civil conflicts, the role of third parties, the process of implementation, and the principal issue (identity or politico-economic) at stake in the conflict. There is no question that this research has proven useful in terms of sensitizing scholars and practitioners to the types of factors that may have an impact on postconflict conditions. In fact, although this emphasis on issues of post–civil war stability is fairly recent, enough work on the subject has been done to make it worthwhile to investigate systematically the influence of key variables

1. Licklider 1995, 681.

on this outcome. We do this, in what follows, by dividing these variables into two categories—one that taps into the potential effects of the environment in which settlements are negotiated and another that focuses on the impact of settlement arrangements. We seek to determine what effect, if any, the relationship between these sets of variables has on the short-term durability of negotiated civil war settlements. We focus on the five years following the end of a conflict because we believe that antagonists' security concerns, which may be critical in undermining a settlement, are likely to be highest in the immediate aftermath of a civil war.

We have two aims in this research note. First, we outline the types of security concerns that make it difficult for groups in divided societies to commit to a stable peace after a civil war, even when they have negotiated a peace agreement. Second, we formulate a series of hypotheses regarding the effects of environmental factors and institutional choices on the durability of peace. We then test these hypotheses against thirty-eight civil war settlements negotiated between 1945 and 1998. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings and suggesting directions for future research on the durability of peace.

Security Concerns and Strategic Interactions in Divided Societies

The intensity of conflict in divided societies frequently reflects prevailing levels of individual and group insecurity. In the majority of settings, where differentiated communities live side by side in relative amity, one can anticipate that group members will feel reasonably secure about their future and that stable intergroup relations will prevail. Data on the post-Soviet republics and post-independence African states, for example, indicate that cooperation is commonplace and incidences of ethnic violence have been relatively low.[2] With institutions in place that promote cooperative behavior, it is not unusual that in many group encounters leaders and groups favor constructive interactions.[3]

But what about groups that have recently resorted to using violence to manage conflict? In this context, a number of factors may serve to heighten the security concerns of leaders and their groups and make it difficult for them to return to stable and constructive relations. The role and limited capacity of the state is clearly a critical element in the strategic interactions between collectivities. The cumulative effects of poverty, unemployment, land pressures, inadequate tax base, lack of education, and insufficient or unavailable human skills act as constraints on the state's capacity to regulate and oversee individual and group compliance with social rules. "A society with weak political institutions," observes Samuel Huntington,

2. Fearon and Laitin 1996.
3. Hardin 1995.

"lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires."[4] Furthermore, a society with weak state institutions is unable to contain predatory behavior by elites.[5]

State weakness involves two interrelated situations, both of which can be highly destabilizing in their consequences. First, when the state is dominated by a single group or coalition of groups and acts aggressively toward out-group interests, exploiting and repressing their politically disadvantaged peoples, it can combine the hardness of military and police strength with the softness of political illegitimacy. Under these conditions the state itself can become the source of manifest grievances and opposition. Examples of the irresponsible state abound. During the early years of Sri Lankan independence, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's government systematically marginalized and discriminated against the Tamil population, creating an environment of polarization and distrust among ethnic groups that persists to the present day. In Somalia Siad Barre's self-interested behavior combined with repressive actions contributed directly to the emergence of a coalition of regionally based opponents who overthrew him in 1991. The indiscriminate killings of Kosovo villagers by heavily armed Serbian police and paramilitary units in 1998 and 1999 led to a burgeoning resistance by armed ethnic Albanian militiamen.

Second, a state's general inability to offer sustained leadership to the society as a whole is likely to result in conflict-creating outcomes. State weakness heightens insecurity because there is no effective agency present that is capable of ensuring implementation of the society's agreed-upon rules. Congolese president Laurent Kabila's discriminatory behavior against the Banyamulenge (or ethnic Tutsi peoples), denying them full rights of citizenship and threatening their physical security, brought on a rebellion in eastern Congo and contributed to the intervention of military forces from neighboring Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda.[6] With no administrative or juridical body willing and able to oversee the rules in a fair manner, groups are largely left to their own devices. Incentives for groups to engage in joint problem solving decline, and actors resort to self-help measures. Either way, the opportunistic, overbearing state or the paralyzed, weak state can foster a political environment in which the rules are inequitably or ineffectively enforced and social actors feel compelled to take action to rectify an unsatisfactory situation. More than likely, new perceptions of insecurity and vulnerability will emerge from such encounters.

The exclusion of representatives from authentic minority groups from critical decision-making processes at the political center can also gravely heighten a community's sense of exposure and vulnerability to other powerful elements in the society. The Derg's disdain for ethnic balancing in Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s, the Sudan's unwillingness to apply the proportionality principle in appointing

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4. Huntington 1968, 24.
5. Walter and Snyder 1999.
6. Lemarchand 2000.

cabinet ministers under post-independence military regimes, and apartheid South Africa's exclusion of black representatives from the electoral process and from the overwhelmingly Afrikaner cabinet contributed to suspicion, social distance, and conflict between the communities.[7] Exclusion is potentially costly to a group's well being because it often involves a limitation on important information, access to those in positions of power, and influence in determining policies and priorities. Prevented from participating in a full and effective manner, group leaders feel denied the power necessary to advance their interests and the interests of their membership. More basically, being excluded from the seats of influence at the political center also creates suspicion of aggressive intentions on the part of adversary interests, whether justifiably or not. In brief, the exclusion of significant group interests undermines confidence about the intentions of a dominant state elite toward political minorities in its midst. Once confidence is replaced with disquietude about the goodwill of competing interests, it becomes quite possible that arbitrary actions will be blown out of proportion and increased insecurities will undermine cooperative behavior. As Arend Lijphart warns, "Minorities that are excluded from power will probably remain excluded and will almost inevitably lose their allegiance to the regime."[8]

This dynamic is clearly demonstrated in the postcolonial history of the Indian state of Assam. The state government's effort to reserve all government benefits for the region's "sons of the soil" beginning in the early 1950s was almost immediately followed by separatist movements among minority groups concerned about their own security within a state that engages in acts of ethnic discrimination. The demands for, and the creation of, new Indian states such as Nagaland from Assamese territory is a striking indication of how minorities may seek to withdraw from regimes they believe are biased against them.[9]

If state fragility and group exclusion are sources of security concerns in divided societies, it is opportunistic, predatory political elites who take advantage of these factors. Where a dominant state elite misuses governmental power to mobilize its supporters to action, forces are set in motion that can, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Congo, and Rwanda, lead to fearsome consequences, including massive forced migration, destruction of property, and genocide. However, if the challenge to intergroup cooperation involves instrumentalist aspects, as it often does, then so does the solution. Policymakers may be able to craft institutions that can reduce the problem of security, by limiting either the threat that central authority is believed to pose or the threat that rival groups may pose to one another.

7. Rothchild 1997, 62–67.
8. Lijphart 1985, 18–19.
9. See Weiner 1978; Weiner, Katzenstein, and Rao 1981; and Wilson 1992.

Environment and Choice

In light of the security concerns groups may face at the end of a civil war, are any types of factors more likely than others to help stabilize the peace? This is likely to be a particularly compelling question for antagonists who are contemplating the use of a negotiated settlement to end an intrastate war. The architects of a negotiated settlement, responsible as they are for providing for the safety of their followers, will want to know not only whether conditions favor an enduring peace but also whether measures can be devised to make such an outcome more likely. We address this question by dividing the types of variables on which scholars of civil wars have focused into two categories. The first category includes variables reflecting the settlement environment. In this instance we are concerned with how characteristics of the country in which the civil war takes place, the larger international environment, and the civil war itself affect the prospects for a durable peace. The second category consists of variables that are features of settlement arrangements. Here we examine the effects on postwar stability of institutions and types of protections often associated with negotiated settlements. By focusing on these two sets of variables we seek to assess the impact of structural factors (the settlement environment), institutional choice, and the relationship between these two sets of variables on the security concerns of combatants and thus their potential to stabilize the peace after civil war.

Our focus is on the stability of negotiated peace settlements over a period of five years after an agreement is concluded. We employ a five-year time frame for the following reasons. First, it seems likely that at least some of the effects of the conflict environment will attenuate over time. After a few years of peace, memories regarding the civil war are likely to have much less political meaning than they did immediately following the war. Second, the effects of institutional arrangements are also likely to change over the years. To the extent that institutions created to help settle a war are credited with stabilizing the peace, for example, they may come to enjoy greater legitimacy and have more significant effects as time passes. Finally, the nature of civil conflict itself can change in the years ahead, making it difficult to analyze the stability of the peace. For example, the power-sharing institutions included in the National Front agreement crafted in 1957 to bring Colombia's civil war to a close served to end the conflict between the Conservative and Liberal parties that had long plagued the country. The partially exclusionary nature of these institutions, however, later gave rise to a completely new civil war, fought over different issues, and among new actors.

There are rare instances in which civil wars resumed after five years of peace;[10] the relevant cases in our data set include Chad, Colombia (although the new civil war was fought among different parties and over different issues), Lebanon, and

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10. We distinguish these cases from those in which civil wars resumed less than five years after a negotiated settlement was signed.

Sudan. Civil war did not resume again in the case of the Yemen Arab Republic, although it did break out in the Yemeni Republic, a country created by the consensual merger, on 22 May 1990, of the Yemen Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. As we focus on the short-term determinants of maintaining a negotiated peace settlement, the reasons for the return of war after such an extended hiatus are beyond the scope of this study.

The Settlement Environment

Analysts have long recognized that elements of the environment in which a settlement is negotiated may influence the potential for creating a durable peace.[11] Scholars have focused on a variety of factors affecting the stability of peace settlements, including the post–Cold War system,[12] previous regime type of the countries in conflict,[13] the strength of the warring parties' forces,[14] the role of ethnicity in conflicts,[15] and the costs of conflicts.[16] Generally speaking, however, scholars have not sought to test the effects on postwar stability of a group of variables that, taken together, could be said to constitute the settlement environment.

Seeking to tap into the types of factors scholars have most emphasized where civil war outcomes are concerned, we define the settlement environment on the basis of variables drawn from three different levels of analysis: the international system, characteristics of the countries experiencing civil conflict, and characteristics of the conflicts themselves. Factors at each of these levels can shape the perceptions of antagonists regarding the prospects of security and thus their commitment to stabilizing the peace. As we hypothesize later, the net effect of the settlement environment on the short-term durability of negotiated civil war settlements is likely to be mixed, with some variables serving to reduce security concerns and thus the risk of failure of an agreement, and others acting to heighten security concerns and increase the likelihood of settlement collapse.

The international system. Although neorealist analysis has typically focused on the effects of the structure of the international system on relations among states, it has more recently been extended to the question of stability following a negotiated civil war settlement.[17] In this instance we are interested in what effects, if any, the bipolar Cold War system that existed between 1945 and 1989 and the post–Cold War system that followed had on the stability of the civil war settlements negotiated between 1945 and 1998. During the Cold War years when the superpowers actively competed for control and influence in the international system, channeling arms and

11. We thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.
12. See Hampson 1996; and Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1997.
13. Hartzell, Mozaffar, and Rothchild 1999.
14. See Mason and Fett 1996; and Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999.
15. Lake and Rothchild 1996.
16. Walter 1997.
17. See Walter 1997; and Hartzell 1999.

aid to groups they favored and funding wars by proxy in a number of countries, civil war antagonists may have felt that they could count on renewed support should they back out of a settlement or should conflict break out anew. With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the decline in levels of U.S. foreign aid, adversaries, aware that support for renewed conflict is less likely to be forthcoming, should now be more willing to commit to a stable peace. We thus expect that the probability of a negotiated settlement proving stable should be highest for those settlements negotiated from 1990 onward.

HYPOTHESIS 1: *Civil war settlements negotiated during the post–Cold War period are more likely to prove stable than those negotiated during the Cold War.*

Characteristics of countries.   As a result of domestic political factors, some countries may be more prone to civil conflict than others and some may find it easier to commit to a stable peace in the wake of a civil war. One key factor that may influence civil adversaries' willingness to act to stabilize the peace is their previous experiences with a political regime. Generally speaking, actors in countries that had a democratic or semidemocratic regime prior to the civil war are more likely to have experience with the accommodation of competing interests than actors in countries whose former political regime was authoritarian.[18] A history of inclusion at the political center, or at least the ability to compete for inclusion in central political institutions, is likely to help ease opponents' fears regarding potentially aggressive intentions by an adversary. This, in turn, should help to ease concerns regarding the potential for an antagonist's violations of or defections from a negotiated settlement.

HYPOTHESIS 2: *Civil war settlements agreed to by actors in countries whose previous regime type was democratic or semidemocratic are more likely to prove stable than those constructed by actors in countries whose regime was authoritarian.*

Characteristics of the conflict.   Scholars have focused on three characteristics of conflicts presumed to affect postwar stability. Perhaps the most debated of these is the issue at stake in the conflict. Some analysts suggest that the stakes in identity conflicts (that is, those involving ethnic, religious, racial, and linguistic interests) are higher and less divisible than the stakes in politico-economic conflicts (that is, those involving socioeconomic and ideological interests). Because the security concerns associated with identity conflicts are assumed to be more intense than those of politico-economic wars, the probability of a settlement proving stable should be greater for the latter type of conflict.[19]

18. Hartzell, Mozaffar, and Rothchild 1999.
19. See Gurr 1990; Licklider 1993; and Kaufmann 1996.

HYPOTHESIS 3: *Negotiated settlements are more likely to prove stable when the issue at stake in the conflict is politico-economic rather than identity based.*

Scholars interested in civil war outcomes have also given considerable attention to conflict intensity. Although the probability of warring parties seeking a negotiated settlement should be greater in high-intensity conflicts (that is, those with high numbers of casualties) than in low-intensity conflicts, we expect that the larger the number of deaths an intrastate conflict produces, the more likely it is that feelings of insecurity will prevail given the fears, memories, and sunk costs associated with high levels of casualties. In our analysis we control for conflict intensity by dividing the number of deaths, in thousands, for each civil war by the number of months each conflict lasted; to reduce variance we log the outcome. In this way, we seek to assess the depth of the security concerns of parties involved in a conflict. Wars in which the number of people killed per month is high are likely to be those that produce the most profound security concerns. The levels of violence involved in these conflicts and the seemingly unrelenting nature of the violence are likely to foster particularly acute concerns by adversaries about the future. Because of these concerns, parties following a high-intensity conflict may prove "trigger happy," ready to interpret seemingly innocuous moves by their opponent as a violation of the terms of the settlement and, through responses of their own, contributing to the breakdown of the settlement.

HYPOTHESIS 4: *A negotiated settlement is more likely to fail if it concludes a civil war of high intensity.*

Finally, scholars have also focused on the effects the duration of conflicts may have on the possibilities of peace once a war has ended. Protracted civil wars have the advantage of serving to provide parties to the conflict with the opportunity to gather information based on the course of the war.[20] As wars become longer and opponents can do no better than fight each other to a standstill, they are increasingly likely to come to believe that they cannot prevail. Not only should this make the alternative to yet more war (a negotiated settlement) more attractive, but it should also increase the likelihood that adversaries will commit to a stable peace. If adversaries' experiences over time have the effect of convincing them that they cannot prevail in battle, they may well calculate that returning to war has no payoff.

HYPOTHESIS 5: *The longer the duration of the war, the greater the probability that the negotiated settlement should prove stable.*

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20. Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999.

Settlement Arrangements

If factors relevant to the settlement environment have mixed effects on antagonists' security concerns and thus on the potential to construct a stable settlement, can settlement architects design arrangements that mitigate security fears and enhance the prospects of stabilizing the peace? Put another way, do the provisions adversaries opt to include as part of a settlement contribute to a more durable short-run peace independent of the settlement environment? Scholars recently have begun to focus on the impact on settlement stability of a number of the arrangements that have been included in negotiated settlements. These range from confidence-building measures,[21] to means of structuring distributive policy,[22] democratic institutions,[23] power-sharing measures,[24] electoral mechanisms,[25] and the role of third-party enforcers.[26] In our analysis we focus on two arrangements, territorial autonomy and third-party enforcers, that have received considerable attention by those seeking to manage recent, highly publicized civil wars.

Territorial autonomy. Territorial autonomy has the advantage of being a relatively flexible institution that can be designed to fit the parameters of the particular conflict at hand.[27] For this reason, formerly warring parties may feel more comfortable embracing territorial autonomy arrangements they have crafted than adopting other conflict management institutions urged on them by outsiders, such as majoritarian democracy, that they may not believe overcome the risks of association.[28] Territorial autonomy is also an institution whose very nature suggests a compromise among contending parties. Although groups with security concerns may demand independence or sovereignty as a means of addressing those concerns, and public officials may seek to strengthen their control at the political center, territorial autonomy may be perceived as a middle ground that, if it holds, will allow each group to promote its interests while ensuring that the other does not gain predominance on certain matters.[29]

Just how do territorially based institutions reassure groups in a divided society that the power of the state will not be seized by one group and used to threaten the security of others? Territorial autonomy arrangements can accomplish this, we argue, in three different ways. First, territorial autonomy can serve to limit authority at the political center by shifting decision-making power to subunits of the state. If issues such as language, education, access to governmental civil service, and social services are considered by a group to be essential to its survival, groups should find

21. Fortna 1998.
22. Hartzell 1999.
23. Licklider 1999.
24. Harris and Reilly 1998.
25. Mozaffar 1998.
26. See Walter 1997; and Peceny and Stanley 2001.
27. Coakley 1993.
28. Sisk 1996.
29. Heintze 1997.

their ability to exercise control over these issues reassuring.[30] By increasing the influence of policymakers at the subnational level while diminishing the powers of policymakers at the center, groups should gain an increased sense that they possess a means of protecting themselves from the exercise of central authority. This is particularly likely to be true when the powers of the subunits extend to their own judiciaries and police forces, for these often serve to augment groups' feelings of autonomous capacity.[31]

Second, and related to the first, territorial autonomy can be used to divide or balance power among groups. Territorial devices that ensure that groups are included in the central government, for example, provide these interests with policymaking influence at the political center and a means of blocking other groups from capturing the state.[32] Arrangements such as federalism can help to promote the goal of power-balancing through the overrepresentation of smaller territorial units in an upper legislative chamber. In addition, as Donald Horowitz contends, federalism may have the added advantage of inducing intergroup cooperation as state representatives find it necessary to enter into broadly encompassing coalitions to ensure that their preferences are acted upon.[33]

Third, territorial autonomy can be used to help reduce the stakes of competition among rival groups in a divided society. One way this can be done is to reduce disparities among groups by enabling a minority people to rise within their own state bureaucracies and educational systems.[34] By making material resources and opportunities available at the subunit level that did not previously exist, territorial autonomy can also diffuse some of the economic power previously controlled by the political center.

Based on these factors, we believe that the negotiated settlements that are most likely to prove stable are those that make provisions for granting territorial autonomy to the relevant subunit(s).[35]

HYPOTHESIS 6: *Negotiated settlements that include territorial autonomy provisions are more likely to prove stable than those that do not.*

Third-party enforcement.   Third-party actors ranging from individual nation states, to regional organizations (such as the Organization of American States and the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group), to

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30. Hannum 1996.
31. Levine 1996.
32. Rothchild and Hartzell 1999.
33. Horowitz 1985.
34. Diamond 1993.
35. Although negotiated settlements that include federalism are reassuring to insecure political minorities, the effect is likely to be more meaningful in the short term. In post–civil war situations, federalism may prove unstable because the minority fears for its future or the majority finds it difficult to commit credibly to maintaining politically decentralized institutions. Consequently, as memories of the peace process dim and political leaders focus increasingly on issues of governance and control, the long-term effectiveness of a federal solution may come into doubt. See Lake and Rothchild 1999.

international organizations (such as the UN) can play a role in reducing the security concerns of antagonists following a civil conflict and thus enhance the likelihood of short-term durability of the peace. These actors can seek to alter the perceptions of opponents by bringing pressure to bear on them and by using a combination of incentives, including financial inducements, recognition and legitimation, and economic sanctions.[36] The most effective means third parties can use to address the security fears of adversaries in the short run, though, is likely to be to promise to intervene in order to provide for the safety of the parties should such a move become necessary. The effect of such a promise is to reassure weaker parties in particular that some actor has committed to uphold the agreement.

Third-party enforcement is unlikely to prove "*the* critical barrier" to stable civil war settlement.[37] Even after such promises have been made by third-party actors, civil war opponents are likely to question the credibility and duration of the enforcers' commitments. They may also question whether the quantity and quality of peacekeeping troops can adequately accomplish the task and, once disarmament has taken place and the central authority of the state has been reconstructed, who will control the coercive powers of that state. In the face of these issues, third-party enforcement seems most likely to help stabilize the peace in the short run. Even this is no mean feat, though, since it is in the short run that inadequate information about the adversary's intentions is likely to prevail and the insecurities that follow from this dearth of information are likely to be highest.

HYPOTHESIS 7: *Negotiated settlements are more likely to prove stable if they make provisions for third-party enforcement.*

We now test these hypotheses.

Data and Method

Case Selection

This study focuses on the relationship between variables relating to the settlement environment and settlement provisions that may potentially influence the stability of civil war resolutions that have been negotiated in the post–World War II era. Intrastate conflicts that broke out between 1945 and 1998 were classified as civil wars if they met the criteria employed by Melvin Small and J. David Singer in the Correlates of War project: (1) The conflict produced at least 1,000 battle deaths per year, (2) the central government was one of the parties to the conflict, (3) there was effective resistance by both the national government and its adversaries during the

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36. See Zartman and Touval 1992; and Rothchild 1997.
37. The phrase in quotations refers to part of the title of Walter's 1997 article on civil war settlement. Emphasis added.

course of the conflict, and (4) the conflict occurred within a defined political unit.[38] Between 1945 and 1998, 103 conflicts met these criteria.

We next coded these civil wars based on how they were resolved. Thirteen of the 103 wars were still unresolved at the end of 1998, and 49 ended in a military victory for one side. Forty-one civil wars were concluded through negotiated settlement. A negotiated settlement was considered to have taken place if representatives of the opposing sides in a conflict held face-to-face talks. Although third-party actors might be participants in the negotiating process, the antagonists themselves had to meet to discuss the issues and conditions they believed to be relevant to ending the war.[39]

In addition, in order to address the possibility that one or more parties negotiated a settlement for tactical purposes (that is, to trick others into relaxing their defenses or for some public relations value they might derive from either local or foreign audiences), a civil war was coded as having been terminated through a negotiated settlement only if the antagonists made an effort to implement the settlement. Consequently, cases such as Uganda, in which a settlement was negotiated and signed in 1985 but never put into effect, have not been included.

How does our data set compare with the other data sets that have focused on negotiated civil war settlements, such as those by Roy Licklider and Barbara Walter? Although our data set concentrates on some of the same independent variables that Walter identifies in her work (such as third-party enforcers and conflict issue), it more closely resembles Licklider's in its identification of the relevant settlements. This is the case for two reasons: the time period covered and the definition of negotiated settlements. Although all three data sets cover roughly a fifty-year period, Walter's begins during the World War II era and concludes with the first year of the post–Cold War period. Our data set, like Licklider's, begins in 1945 and extends into the post–Cold War period. The fact that a large number of civil wars have been ended through negotiated settlements in the post–Cold War period may help to explain why both our data set and Licklider's identify more negotiated settlement cases than does Walter's. Furthermore, much like Licklider, we define a negotiated settlement as having taken place if the parties ended the violence after a process of negotiations. Although we specify that the antagonists must have interacted with one another in the process of negotiations, we do not spell out the content or outcome of those negotiations, preferring to focus on these as independent variables pertinent to the negotiated settlements. Walter, however, employs a more stringent definition of negotiations, coding civil wars as having had

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38. Small and Singer 1982.
39. It is for this reason that three of the negotiated settlements were eliminated from the forty-one negotiated agreements reached during the 1945–98 period. Thus, even though fighting has not resumed to date in the settlements negotiated to end the Korean war and the 1974 war in Cyprus, the absence of civil war in both these cases, and for a ten-year period following the end of the 1963–64 civil war in Cyprus, is not the product of a settlement directly agreed to by the adversaries themselves. Rather, third-party actors imposed a settlement of sorts in these cases.

negotiations if "issues relevant to resolving the war were discussed."[40] This narrower definition of negotiations may also explain why Walter identifies fewer negotiated settlement cases than we do.

Operationalizing the Variables

Once the negotiated settlements were identified, we then calculated the dependent variable, the number of months peace endures. Consistent with our focus on those factors that might improve the durability of negotiated civil war settlements in the short term, the value of the dependent variable is confined to values of up to sixty months. In those instances in which civil war broke out again following a negotiated settlement within this five-year term limit, the number of months between the signing of the agreement and the outbreak of conflict was totaled.

For the thirty-eight cases, agreements are at risk of failure for a total of 1,592 months.[41] The mean survival time for a single civil war settlement is approximately 42 months.[42] Contrary to the pessimism scholars often voice about the prospects of negotiated settlements of civil wars,[43] our data indicate a high rate of success for these arrangements in the short-term. Only fourteen of the thirty-eight peace agreements we examine, approximately 37 percent, ended in a return to civil violence within five years.

Whenever possible, we coded the independent variables based on the texts of the negotiated settlements themselves. In those instances where we were unable to obtain a copy of the agreement for coding, we employed case studies of the conflicts and their resolution and material from *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* and the annual *SIPRI Yearbook* of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Further information on the sources and coding rules we employed appears in the appendix.

Methodology

Our method of calculating the dependent variable means that we include cases that are right-censored observations. This means that we treat negotiated settlements that lasted more than five years as having run their course when in fact they often continue to survive. We might have addressed this issue by eliminating all right-censored observations from our data set. However, doing so would have limited the

40. Walter 1999, 127, fn 1.

41. This figure totals the survival time in months of all agreements included in our study. The highest possible value for any single agreement is sixty months.

42. The coding of the dependent variable for the case of India (1946–48) requires further comment. India's civil war settlement is coded as lasting 0.1 months. This unique value is necessary because the civil war settlement lasted less than one month and survival analysis models cannot accommodate cases that simultaneously enter the data set and fail.

43. See, for example, Stedman 1991; and Licklider 1995.

number of cases available for analysis; and, unless the factors that produce censoring are absolutely unrelated to the factors that produce an event's occurrence, "truncating the sample to include only uncensored observations would produce a biased sample because only observations initially prone to experience an event would be included."[44] Instead, we address this issue by employing a Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the rate of failure of negotiated civil war settlements.[45]

Using this methodology provides an important advantage over earlier studies that were concerned with the factors that increase the durability of civil war settlements. These works often relied on methodologies associated with dichotomously defined dependent variables. Both Licklider and Walter employ such approaches, categorizing agreements as a success or failure depending on whether they endured five years.[46] Because we do not use such a blunt instrument to study the durability of settlements, our alternative technique provides for a more precise understanding of the relationship between particular variables and a settlement's short-term survival.

Empirical Analysis

The Cox proportional hazards model we test is expressed in the following equation:

$$log\ h\ (t) = a(t) + b1\ (\text{international system structure})$$
$$+\ b2\ (\text{previous regime type}) + b3\ (\text{conflict issue}) + b4\ (\text{conflict intensity})$$
$$+\ b5\ (\text{conflict duration}) + b6\ (\text{territorial autonomy})$$
$$+\ b7\ (\text{third-party enforcement})$$

We present the results for this model, employing robust standard errors, in Table 1. The hazard rate statistic, defined as the exponent of the coefficient, indicates whether higher values of each of the independent variables have the potential to increase or decrease the duration of a negotiated civil war peace agreement. Variables with hazard rates below the baseline value of 1 tend to decrease the potential failure of an agreement; variables with hazard rates higher than 1 increase

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44. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1417.
45. We chose the Cox proportional hazards model, as opposed to the alternatives of the parametric exponential and Weibull models, because we make no assumptions regarding whether newer settlements are more susceptible to failure than those that have been established for a longer period of time. The Cox model allows one to estimate the effects of independent variables on duration of time "without having to assume a specific parametric form for the distribution of time until an event occurs." Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1432.
46. See Licklider 1995; and Walter 1997.

TABLE 1. *Cox proportional hazards model estimates with robust standard errors*

Variable	Coefficient	Hazard rate
Category I: Settlement environment		
International system structure	−1.25	0.29
	(0.73)	(0.21)
Previous regime type	−2.27*	0.1
	(1.04)	(0.11)
Conflict issue	1.99	7.33
	(1.2)	(8.76)
Conflict intensity	0.88***	2.4
	(0.23)	(0.56)
Conflict duration	−1.57**	0.21
	(0.58)	(0.12)
Category II: Settlement provisions		
Territorial autonomy	−3.25*	0.04
	(1.39)	(0.05)
Third-party enforcer	−4.05***	0.02
	(1.17)	(0.02)
N	38	
Months at risk	1,592	
χ^2	36.06	
Prob > χ^2	0.0000	
Log-likelihood	−30.89	

Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.
***$p < .001$.
**$p < .01$.
*$p < .05$.

the risk of failure of the negotiated settlement. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M Siverson offer this reading of the hazard rate statistic: "The hazard's deviation from 1.00 is interpreted as the percentage increase or decrease in the likelihood of political survival resulting from the marginal impact of the independent variable, so that the relative effects of the variables can be discerned by the magnitudes of the hazards."[47]

Whether a particular variable increases or decreases the survival of a negotiated civil war settlement is also reflected in the positive or negative value of its coefficient. Positive values indicate an increased probability of the failure of an agreement, and negative values suggest the opposite.

Five variables in the equation we test prove to have statistically significant effects on the stability of civil war settlements. Three of these influential indicators are associated with the environment in which the settlement is carried out; the other two

47. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995, 851.

statistically significant variables fit within the category of provisions laid out in the negotiated settlement itself.[48]

In terms of the settlement environment, our results indicate that previous experience with the democratic norms of compromise and accommodation increases the probability that a negotiated peace settlement will endure. Compared with attempts to implement a comparable agreement in an environment that lacks a history of democracy, we find that if a state's last stable regime prior to civil conflict was partially or fully democratic, the hazard of failure of the negotiated settlement decreases by 90 percent.

It appears that states that have experienced civil wars with a relatively higher number of battle deaths in each month of war, as reflected in our intensity variable, have a greater risk of their negotiated settlement failing than states that have emerged from less intense domestic wars. A one-unit increase in this variable, measured as an additional one thousand battle deaths per month (using a natural log transformation), leads to a 140 percent increased hazard of a return to civil war. We hypothesize that the importance of this variable is attributable to security concerns. The higher the casualty rate, and the greater the sunk costs, the more concerned groups will be about their safety; as a result, they will have more difficulty committing to a stable peace.

We find that the longer the period of domestic war prior to the negotiated settlement, the less likely is the resumption of the conflict in the short-term. For each unit increase in duration of the war, measured as an additional month of war (employing a natural log transformation), there is a 79 percent reduction in the hazard that a peace agreement will fail. Long civil wars thus seem to convince groups of the futility of prevailing and thus the need to accommodate one another's interests in a manner that mitigates security concerns.

Two variables associated with the settlement environment, at least on the basis of a two-tailed test, do not prove to have a determining influence on the duration of the negotiated civil war settlement: the issue at stake in the conflict and the structure of

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48. In order to assess the robustness of the results, we tested this same model using discrete time-series logistic regression. Time was represented by five natural cubic spline variables, with each of these new indicators reflecting an additional year that a civil war agreement had the potential to survive. For a discussion of this methodology, see Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998. Diagnostic tests revealed that the three cases of Laos 1959–73, Croatia 1991, and Sierra Leone 1991–96 are a poor fit with our model and have an influence on the results. All are instances of negotiated settlements that failed. Although there appears to be no obvious reason to exclude these three cases from our data set, we performed a retest of the Cox model without them in order to determine their influence on our findings. In the new test excluding outliers, the four variables of previous regime type, conflict intensity, conflict duration, and third-party enforcement retained statistical significance. The indicator reflecting territorial autonomy was only significant if we employed a one-tailed test. In addition the international system structure variable proved statistically significant at the .001 level in this test with a hazard rate value of .08. The new hazard rate values for each of the remaining significant indicators are listed here in parentheses: previous regime type (.06), conflict intensity (3.87), conflict duration (.14), territorial autonomy (.03), and third-party enforcement (.009). These consistent findings of significance for the same variables identified as important in the original model suggest highly robust findings that are not dependent on the influence of any particular case.

the international system. The first of these results can be explained in light of the security concerns groups have at the end of a civil war. Although the stakes in politico-economic conflicts may be more easily divisible than in identity conflicts, groups that fought and died in bloody conflicts of the former type are likely to consider the stakes just as high as in identity wars. Perhaps more to the point, antagonists in both types of conflicts face the same set of security concerns regarding questions of how and by whom and to what end central state authority is to be exercised after the war's end. Put this way, there is little reason to believe that peace settlements should prove more durable following one type of conflict than another.

The fact that the international system structure variable did not have a significant effect on settlement duration is more difficult to explain. After all, it seems reasonable to conclude that antagonists would be more concerned about their security and more skeptical about the chances for a durable peace if each knew the other had it within its means to receive assistance from sponsor states that would allow it to reinitiate a conflict. Because the likelihood of such aid was highest during the Cold War period, we expected that settlements constructed during that time would prove less likely to endure. The lack of support for this hypothesis may indicate either that antagonists do not perceive a clear linkage between some types of environmental factors and their security concerns or that sponsor states may not have been considered all that reliable or influential.

In addition, because we distinguish between the Cold War and post–Cold War periods in terms of the amount of arms and aid available to insurgent groups, the fact that there has been an uncontrollable flow of black market arms across international borders in the post–Cold War period may indicate that we have failed to tap into any real difference between system structures and their effects on short-term settlement stability.

In the category of the settlement arrangements themselves, the statistically significant factors are arrangements for territorial autonomy and the offer of security enforcement by a third-party state. Based on the hazard rate values, it appears that the presence of both these provisions in a negotiated settlement increases the chances of maintaining the peace. A territorial autonomy provision in an agreement reduces the hazard of its failure by approximately 96 percent; the inclusion of a third-party enforcer of the agreement reduces the hazard by an estimated 98 percent.

Because these two settlement provision variables are represented by dichotomous variables, we can illustrate their influence on the longevity of a negotiated agreement by using both tables and graphs. We compare the survivor function statistics for agreements on the basis of whether they include a provision for territorial autonomy or a promise by a third party to offer protection for the agreement. The survivor function statistic reflects the proportion of cases that did not fail by

FIGURE 1. *Comparison of survivor functions for the territorial autonomy provision (Kaplan-Meier survival estimates)*

resuming their civil war.[49] In the tables, survivor functions are listed by year; the graphs, using Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, are based on changes of the survivor function in months over the same five-year period. Figure 1 and Table 2 illustrate the importance of a territorial autonomy provision for the survival of a peace agreement.

Those civil war settlements that included such a provision are consistently more likely to survive the five-year period of interest to this study. Only 44 percent of agreements without a territorial autonomy arrangement were still in force after five years compared with a survival rate of 65 percent among peace agreements that provided for regional autonomy. A similar trend appears when comparing agreements that include the promise by a third party to enforce the settlement to those that fail to do so. We show this pattern in Figure 2 and Table 3. Five years after the signing of a peace agreement, the survivor rate among settlements with an external assurance is 68 percent compared with 32 percent for arrangements lacking such a promise.

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49. Survivor functions seek to illustrate the likelihood that a particular observation will last over time. In this sense the survivor function is the inverse of the focus on the likelihood of failure associated with hazard ratios. However, hazard ratios and survivor functions should not be considered readily comparable. The former determines a variable's impact on peace settlement duration while controlling for the influence of other indicators in the model; the latter does not control for the influence of any other variables that might prove important in conditioning the longevity of peace agreements.

TABLE 2. *Comparison of survivor functions for the territorial autonomy provision*

A. Without territorial autonomy provision

Year	Begin	Total fail	Censored	Survivor function
1	20	4	2	0.80
2	14	2	0	0.69
3	12	0	1	0.69
4	11	1	3	0.61
5	7	2	5	0.44

B. With territorial autonomy provision

| Year	Begin	Total fail	Censored	Survivor function
1	18	1	0	0.94
2	17	0	1	0.94
3	16	1	1	0.88
4	14	1	2	0.81
5	11	2	9	0.65

FIGURE 2. *Comparison of survivor functions for the third-party enforcer provision (Kaplan-Meier survival estimates)*

TABLE 3. *Comparison of survivor functions for the third-party enforcer provision*

A. *Without third-party enforcer*

Year	Begin	Total fail	Censored	Survivor function
1	14	3	0	0.79
2	11	1	0	0.71
3	10	1	1	0.64
4	8	1	2	0.52
5	5	2	3	0.32

B. *With third-party enforcer*

Year	Begin	Total fail	Censored	Survivor function
1	24	2	2	0.92
2	20	1	1	0.87
3	18	0	1	0.87
4	17	1	3	0.82
5	13	2	11	0.68

Conclusion

The statistical test results presented in this research note point to a number of factors that appear to influence the durability of negotiated civil war settlements. The most durable settlements are likely to be those that (1) concern states in which the previous stable regime was a democracy, (2) conclude civil conflicts of low intensity that lasted for extended periods of time, (3) include in the peace agreement provisions for the territorial autonomy of threatened groups, and (4) have security assurances offered to the former combatants by third-party states or regional or international organizations. Negotiated civil war resolutions for states that lack experience with democracy and have just concluded brief wars of great intensity are more likely to fail in the short term. This is especially true if the negotiating parties to the conflict fail to include provisions for territorial autonomy and third-party security assurances in their agreement.

These results have several implications for efforts to manage civil conflict. First, some civil war environments are more likely to result in stable peace settlements than are others. This finding may well give pause to civil war opponents who find that the parameters of the conflict in which they are engaged do not augur well for a stable peace following a negotiated settlement. Although this might dissuade some

actors from attempting to negotiate an end to civil conflict, it could also serve to persuade settlement architects to take one another's security concerns more seriously and to design measures to mitigate those concerns. Our finding that institutional arrangements (such as territorial autonomy) can contribute to a more durable peace independent of the settlement environment might provide support for those interested in including such provisions in negotiated settlements. We should also emphasize that our results indicate that civil war environments are not absolutely deterministic where the stability of negotiated settlements is concerned. To that end, the fact that an environmental variable such as the structure of the international system did not have a significant effect on settlement duration is encouraging, since there is essentially nothing actors can do to change the structure of the international system at the time they negotiated a settlement.

Second, this study may serve to give some guidance to outside actors interested in ending war-related suffering and stabilizing the peace. Our results indicate that settlements are least likely to endure when they follow intensely violent conflicts. In this instance, the message for third parties appears to be that early intervention into a conflict that serves to reduce the casualty rate may contribute to a more durable peace. Our study also shows that once the fighting has stopped, third parties can play a positive role in stabilizing the peace by offering security assurances to parties as part of a negotiated settlement. In addition, outside actors could also seek to play a positive role by encouraging opponents to include institutions such as territorial autonomy in their negotiated settlements.

Yet another promising implication of this research is that it does appear possible to create a more durable peace without explicitly solving the issues at stake in a conflict. Designing new institutional arrangements for the management of conflict may contribute significantly to stabilizing the peace. This is encouraging because designing solutions to the issues that initially gave rise to a conflict may be difficult indeed. This is particularly likely to be the case where the conflict itself gives rise to new issues and concerns. It is for this reason that we think it worthwhile to focus on the security concerns of civil war adversaries; no matter what a civil war may initially have been about, once antagonists have set about killing one another they are likely to be concerned about their future security. Although challenging, devising institutional means to enhance the security of former opponents may prove a more productive means of stabilizing the peace than attempting to identify and address the often complex origins of disputes.

Finally, we should emphasize that we have examined only the short-term implications of the settlement environment and settlement arrangements on the stability of negotiated settlements. Although we believe that the effects of the settlement environment on the security concerns of antagonists are likely to attenuate over time, we have not tested this proposition. Nor do we know how settlement provisions such as territorial autonomy and third-party assurances hold up in the long run. Perhaps the ability of these arrangements to mitigate opponents' security concerns also weakens over time. If this is the case, opponents may wish to include other arrangements, such as power sharing, in their settlements that we have

not considered in this note. These and other hypotheses regarding the long-run determinants of postconflict peace await further testing. In the interim, studies like this may serve to encourage actors to realize that choices do matter and that they can play a real role in helping to construct a stable peace.

Appendix: Negotiated Civil War Settlements, Coding Rules, and Sources

TABLE A1. *Negotiated civil war settlements*

Case	Territorial autonomy[a]	Third-party enforcer[b]	Conflict intensity[c] (logged)	System structure[d]	Previous regime type[e]	Conflict issue[f]	Duration (logged)[g]
Angola, 1975–89	0	0	−1.89	0	1	1	2.23
Angola, 1989–91	0	1	1.26	1	1	1	1.32
Angola, 1992–94	1	1	1.1	1	1	1	1.2
Azerbaijan, 1989–94	1	0	−1.06	1	1	1	1.72
Bosnia, 1992–95	1	1	1.82	1	1	1	1.63
Cambodia, 1970–91	0	1	1.82	1	1	0	2.41
Chad, 1979–79	0	1	0.51	0	1	1	0.78
Chad, 1989–96	0	0	−2.53	1	1	1	1.88
Chechnya, 1994–96	1	0	1.38	1	1	1	1.3
Colombia, 1948–57	0	0	0.95	0	2	0	2.04
Croatia, 1991–92	0	1	0.36	1	2	1	0.85
Croatia, 1995–95	0	1	−1.1	1	2	1	0.48
Dom. Rep., 1965–65	0	1	−0.28	0	1	0	0.6
El Salvador, 1979–92	0	1	−0.69	1	1	0	2.18
Georgia (SO), 1989–92	1	1	−2.33	1	1	0	1.49
Georgia (Ab), 1992–94	1	1	−1.94	1	1	0	1.32
Guatemala, 1963–96	1	0	−1.06	1	1	0	2.61
Guinea Bissau, 1998–98	0	1	−1.61	1	2	0	0.7
India, 1946–49	1	0	3.23	0	1	1	1.5
Iraq, 1961–70	1	0	0.03	0	1	1	2.01
Laos, 1959–73	0	0	−1.66	0	1	0	2.2
Lebanon, 1958–58	0	1	−0.69	0	2	1	0.6
Lebanon, 1975–89	0	1	−0.07	0	1	1	2.24
Liberia, 1989–93	0	1	1.27	1	1	1	1.63
Liberia, 1994–96	0	1	0.7	1	1	1	1.4
Malaysia, 1948–56	1	0	−2.05	0	1	1	2
Moldova, 1992–92	1	1	−1.95	1	2	1	0.85
Mozambique, 1982–92	1	1	−0.02	1	1	0	2.1
Nicaragua, 1981–89	1	1	−1.13	0	1	0	1.97
Papua New G., 1989–98	1	1	−1.77	1	2	0	2.03
Philippines, 1972–96	1	0	−0.85	1	1	1	2.45
Rwanda, 1990–93	0	1	2.68	1	1	1	1.54
Sierra Leone, 1992–96	0	0	−1.36	1	1	0	1.74
South Africa, 1983–91	1	0	−1.84	1	1	1	2
Sudan, 1963–72	1	1	1.61	0	1	1	2

TABLE A1. *continued*

Case	Territorial autonomy[a]	Third-party enforcer[b]	Conflict intensity[c] (logged)	System structure[d]	Previous regime type[e]	Conflict issue[f]	Duration (logged)[g]
Tajikistan, 1992–97	0	1	−0.21	1	1	1	1.79
Yemen (AR), 1962–70	1	0	−1.77	0	1	0	1.95
Zimbabwe, 1972–79	0	1	−1.93	0	1	1	1.92

[a]*Territorial autonomy:* Coded 1 if the negotiated settlement calls for either of the following: (1) allowing one (or more) subunits of the country to exercise control over local issues, without extending those powers to other subunits of the country; (2) providing that all subunits have similar internal governance structures and wield powers separate from those possessed by the central government. Coded zero if the agreement does not provide for any such arrangement. The texts of the negotiated settlements were used to code territorial autonomy. If these were not available, case study material, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* and *SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmaments* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) were used.

[b]*Third-party enforcer:* Coded 1 if an outside power sends troops to separate or protect civil war antagonists from one another or at least promises to do so if the security situation calls for such action. Coded zero if troops are neither sent nor such promises are made. Sources used to code this variable are *SIPRI Yearbook, Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* the texts of the negotiated settlements, tables in de Jonge Oudraat 1996, and case study material.

[c]*Conflict intensity:* The number, in thousands, of war-related deaths was divided by the duration of the conflict in months. This number was then logged to reduce variance. In the majority of the cases, the month and year the conflict started and ended was based on the Correlates of War (COW) civil war database; where there were questions regarding the dates identified in the COW database or the conflicts were too recent to have been included in the database, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* and case study material were used to identify the dates. In the majority of the cases, the number of civil war deaths was drawn from the COW database. Data were checked against data in Sivard 1996; where discrepancies between the two sources existed, we consulted the *SIPRI Yearbook* and used case study material.

[d]*System structure:* Coded zero if the settlement was negotiated during the Cold War years from 1945 to 1989 and 1 if the settlement was constructed in the post–Cold War period from 1990 onward.

[e]*Previous regime type:* Coded 1 if the country had an authoritarian regime in place prior to the outbreak of the civil war and 2 if the regime was either semidemocratic or democratic. Coding for this variable was based on Gasiorowski 1996; and for those conflicts ending after 1992, on Freedom House 1999. Because there were no cases in which the previous regime type was "democratic," we collapsed this category into "semidemocratic." Although we did not use the Polity III data set because of a number of missing data entries, we should note that the correlation between Gasiorowski's measure of democracy and the Polity III measure of democracy is 0.85, whereas the correlation between Polity III and the political rights element of the Freedom House measure is 0.92. For further information on the correlations, see Jaggers and Gurr 1995.

[f]*Conflict issue:* Coded 1 if the primary issue at stake in the conflict was ethnic, religious, racial, or linguistic; coded zero otherwise. In the majority of the cases the coding for the conflict issue was based on Licklider's coding of the variable; Licklider 1995. In those cases in which the settlements postdate Licklider, or case study material raised questions regarding Licklider's coding of the material, we drew upon statements by the parties to the conflict regarding the issues they believed to be at stake in the conflict and consulted Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1997, *SIPRI Yearbook* summaries of civil war cases, and case study materials.

[g]*Conflict duration:* The duration of the conflict is based on the length of the conflict in months; this number was then logged to reduce variance. In the majority of the cases the month and year the conflict started and ended are based on those identified in the COW civil war database. Where there were questions regarding the dates identified in the COW database or the conflicts were too recent to have been included in that database, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* and case study material were used to identify the start and end dates of the conflict.

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