The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post—Civil War Democracy

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THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE: Power Sharing and Post–Civil War Democracy

By CAROLINE A. HARTZELL and MATTHEW HODDIE*

Politics is the art of the possible.
—Otto von Bismarck

ALTHOUGH there is now a wealth of scholarship concerning the onset, duration, and termination of civil wars, there is not nearly as much empirical research by political scientists on the potential for postconflict democratization in countries that have been the site of civil wars. This relative scholarly neglect of post–civil war democratization stands in contrast to the efforts and resources that other actors—foreign ministries, international and nongovernmental organizations, and members of civil society—have invested in attempting to help construct democracy in postconflict states such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Uganda.

Establishing democracy in the aftermath of a civil war has proved to be a challenging proposition. By our count, only thirty-five of the sixty-three countries that experienced civil war from 1945 through the end of 2006 made the transition to a minimalist, Schumpeterian form of democracy during the first decade following the end of their respective armed conflicts. Although many countries do not experience the emergence of democracy after civil war, these figures indicate that others clearly do. Drawing on insights from institutionalist scholarship,

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1 The only published works we are familiar with that engage in a comparative empirical investigation of post–civil war democratization are Wantchekon and Neeman 2002; Wantchekon 2004; Fortna 2008; Gurses and Mason 2008; Joshi 2010; and Fortna and Huang 2012.

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we seek to explain why some countries are able to make that transition despite the fact that the post–civil war environment is a particularly difficult setting in which to cultivate democracy. We argue that power-sharing institutions, as measures that warring parties have at times established at the conclusion of domestic armed conflict, have made it possible for some countries to make the transition to democracy successfully after civil war. By minimizing political actors’ sense of insecurity, power-sharing institutions make it feasible for leaders and their supporters to consider the use of elections as a means of determining who will rule the state. Put another way, it is because power-sharing arrangements help to mitigate some of the uncertainty associated with democracy that actors emerging from civil war may be persuaded to adopt at least a minimally democratic political system.

Three factors distinguish our analysis of the relationship between power sharing and post–civil war democracy from previous scholarship on the topic. First, although some research has identified a positive relationship between power sharing and democracy in both established and newer democracies, this study asserts that power-sharing institutions can help to encourage the emergence of democracy in a particular subset of countries: those that have experienced civil war. This claim, it should be noted, challenges the arguments made by a number of scholars regarding the pernicious effects that power sharing has on post-conflict democracy.

Second, our work calls attention to the unique challenges that the post–civil war environment poses for transitions to democracy by emphasizing the nature of the security concerns that both elites and masses face following civil wars. We argue that such security concerns are one reason that it is particularly difficult to construct democracy following civil war.

A final contribution of this work is the explanation it offers for the inclusion of power-sharing institutions as part of civil war-ending settlements. Although a growing number of studies have employed power-sharing arrangements as an independent variable in their analyses, little attention has been given to the question of the factors that shape these institutional choices. We contend that power-sharing institutions are designed as a means of ending particularly difficult civil wars—that is, conflicts that are prolonged, show signs of having reached a stalemate, and produce an acute sense of insecurity on the part of the groups involved in the conflict. If, as we posit, power-sharing institutions are not randomly distributed across the population of war-ending agreements but are instead created as a response to difficult civil wars, that is, to
conflicts that generate little or no expectation among domestic actors that democracy will prevail at the war’s end, then decisions to share power and to adopt democracy may well be interrelated. The effect of this dynamic could be to mask the positive effects that power-sharing institutions have on postconflict democracy. Our attention to the potential role this source of bias may play, as well as our efforts to test for it in our empirical analysis, distinguish this study from others that have focused on relationships between power sharing and democracy.

This article is divided into six parts. First, we provide an overview of the concept of power sharing. Second, we discuss the factors that make democratization difficult in the aftermath of civil wars and develop the claim that a minimalist form of democracy is the most realistic possibility following intrastate conflict. Third, we provide our justification for the democracy-enhancing effects of power-sharing institutions. Fourth, we explain why civil war adversaries agree to construct power-sharing institutions. Next, we provide an empirical test of the relationship among difficult conflicts, power sharing, and post–civil war democracy. We conclude with some observations regarding the implications of our analysis.

**Power Sharing and Democracy: An Overview**

The earliest studies of power-sharing institutions appear in the work of Arend Lijphart. Focused on states such as Belgium and the Netherlands, his research makes a causal connection between mechanisms that distribute political power among a country’s competing groups and lasting periods of stability. The institutions Lijphart focuses on are government by a grand coalition, proportionality in the distribution of government positions, guarantees of a minority veto over policy issues that communities might perceive as threatening, and autonomy for identity groups. Describing these arrangements collectively as consociational democracy, Lijphart suggests that a relationship between power sharing and stability exists because these mechanisms provide minorities with assurances that they will not be permanently excluded from power or shut out of the policy-making process. In short, power sharing addresses concerns that government will become a tyranny of the majority.

More recent work has sought to extend Lijphart’s insights to the particularly fragile political environment associated with post–civil war
states. Consistent with Lijphart’s original argument, this research suggests that providing competing collectivities with a guaranteed share of government power as part of a civil war settlement creates the sense of security required for each group to support a peaceful and permanent resolution to the conflict. Through mechanisms that distribute state power among former armed adversaries in a manner that prevents any one group from becoming dominant, power-sharing institutions reassure rivals that no single entity will use the power of the state in a way that promotes its interests while threatening the security of others. By addressing security concerns, these measures thus increase the likelihood that adversaries will remain committed to the peace.3

One important way that studies centered on civil war part company with Lijphart’s work is in terms of their understanding of the scope of power-sharing institutions. The original research concerning consociationalism was focused on the distribution of political power, while more recent work on civil war settlements also considers the influence of three other dimensions of government power: military, territorial, and economic.4 Table 1, which displays trends in the use of power sharing as a means of ending intrastate conflicts, reveals the diverse nature of the power-sharing institutions that have been included in civil war settlements.

The definition of power sharing employed in this study embraces this broader conceptualization of the bases of government power. Accordingly, we characterize power-sharing institutions as “rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power.”5 These institutions serve to ensure that no single group can use the capacity of the state to threaten the interests of others. Arrangements designed to accomplish this task include measures for sharing or dividing power across the political, military, territorial, and economic dimensions of state power.6

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3 Hartzell and Hoddie 2003.
4 While consociationalism allows for territorial autonomy arrangements, the focus tends to be on power sharing at the political center.
5 Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 320.
6 For the sake of convenience, we employ the term “power sharing” to refer both to power-sharing and power-dividing mechanisms. This is contrary to the approach favored in Roeder and Rothchild 2005, which highlights a distinction between power sharing and power dividing. We opt not to follow Roeder and Rothchild’s formulation for three reasons. First, the type of power-dividing mechanisms we focus on (that is, territorial autonomy and some forms of economic power sharing) differ from the concept of power dividing employed by Roeder and Rothchild that emphasizes “extensive civil rights that empower all citizens and groups” and the “separation of power among the governmental organs of the common-state,” p. 61, attributes that we believe are generally lacking or very difficult to establish in states emerging from civil war. Second, the power-sharing and power-dividing mechanisms that
Political power sharing emphasizes proportionality in the distribution of central state authority. Collectivities are guaranteed a degree of representation within governing institutions based on their group affiliation. The mechanisms that can be used to achieve this end are proportional representation in elections, proportional representation in the government’s administration, and proportional representation in the government’s executive branch. An example of the latter may be found in Burundi, where Tutsis and Hutus agreed to share power at the political center in 2004 by having two vice presidents, one from each ethnic group, to assist the president, as well as by staffing the cabinet at a ratio of 60 percent Hutu to 40 percent Tutsi.

Table 1
TRENDS IN THE USE OF POWER SHARING AS A MEANS OF ENDING CIVIL WARS, 1945–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade War Ended</th>
<th>Number of Civil Wars Ended in Decade</th>
<th>Number of Settlements Calling for Power Sharing</th>
<th>Distribution of Type of Power-Sharing Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945–1949</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 (28.5%)</td>
<td>political: 2 military: 0 territorial: 1 economic: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>political: 2 military: 0 territorial: 0 economic: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>political: 1 military: 0 territorial: 0 economic: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8 (38%)</td>
<td>political: 7 military: 5 territorial: 3 economic: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6 (46%)</td>
<td>political: 4 military: 4 territorial: 3 economic: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34 (74%)</td>
<td>political: 26 military: 25 territorial: 15 economic: 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This column sums the total number of each type of power-sharing measure that appears in the settlements that call for power sharing in each decade. The numbers indicate the diversity of types of power-sharing measures that rivals agree to as part of civil war settlements.

Political power sharing emphasizes proportionality in the distribution of central state authority. Collectivities are guaranteed a degree of representation within governing institutions based on their group affiliation. The mechanisms that can be used to achieve this end are proportional representation in elections, proportional representation in the government’s administration, and proportional representation in the government’s executive branch. An example of the latter may be found in Burundi, where Tutsis and Hutus agreed to share power at the political center in 2004 by having two vice presidents, one from each ethnic group, to assist the president, as well as by staffing the cabinet at a ratio of 60 percent Hutu to 40 percent Tutsi.
Military power sharing seeks to distribute authority within the coercive apparatus of the state. The most straightforward means of sharing military power is integrating the antagonists’ armed forces into a unified state security force. A proportional formula that reflects the relative size of the armed factions can be used to accomplish this, or a strict balance in troop numbers can be established among the contending parties. The latter method was applied in Burundi, where the state’s security forces include equal numbers of Hutus and Tutsis. Alternatively, military power can be distributed by appointing members of the subordinate group(s) to key leadership positions in the state’s security forces. Lastly, in limited instances, striking a balance among the militaries of antagonists may involve allowing opposing sides to remain armed or to retain their own security forces.

Territorial power sharing seeks to divide political influence among different levels of government by creating forms of decentralized government that are territorially based. Provisions for federalism or regional autonomy offer regionally concentrated groups a degree of power that is independent from the central government. In addition, regions within a federal system that are represented in the institutions of the federal government have the opportunity to monitor and check actions at the federal level that they fear may be inimical to their interests. An example of territorial power sharing as part of an effort to end civil war is found in Sudan’s Addis Ababa Accords of 1972. The agreement provided southern Sudan with a degree of autonomy from the national government, and called for the establishment of an elected Southern Regional Assembly.7

Finally, it has been suggested that “[f]or minority groups, losing an election is a matter of not simply losing office, but of having no access to the resources of the state and thus losing the means for protecting the survival of the group.”8 Economic power sharing attempts to address exactly this type of concern regarding the question of access to and control of economic resources under the purview of the state. Designed to distribute wealth, income, or control of natural resources or production facilities on some group basis, economic power-sharing measures have been used in countries such as Sierra Leone and Indonesia. In the case of Sierra Leone’s 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement, economic power sharing was apparent in the commitment to appoint rebel leader Foday Sankoh as chairman of the newly created Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources. This entity was to be

7 Rothchild and Hartzell 1993.
8 Linder and Bächtinger 2005, 864.
responsible for overseeing the country’s extensive gold and diamond resources.⁹

**Existing Scholarship on Power Sharing and Democracy**

Previous studies have found empirical support for the argument that power sharing exercises a positive influence on democracy. Prominent among these is Pippa Norris’s book, *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?*, which considers the influence of power-sharing institutions on the democratic performance of countries around the globe from 1972 to 2004.¹⁰ Norris’s results indicate that states with institutions that are consistent with power sharing tend to perform better in terms of democracy.

In a similar vein, Wolf Linder and André Bächtiger present a statistical analysis of the democratic performance of sixty-two African and Asian countries from 1965 until the end of 1995. In order to capture the degree to which power sharing is employed within these states, Linder and Bächtiger draw a distinction between levels of vertical power sharing (the degree to which regions are autonomous from the political center) and horizontal power sharing (the extent to which groups have representation within the central government). Their analyses also suggest that power sharing and democracy are often compatible. They conclude that states that include provisions for horizontal power sharing tend to be more democratic than states that fail to include these types of accommodations, while vertical power sharing does not appear influential in determining the level of democracy within a state.¹¹

**Power Sharing and Post–Civil War Democracy: The Critics’ Position**

Although an established literature has identified a relationship between power sharing, political stability, and democracy, some research has suggested that power-sharing institutions might actually stifle the potential for democracy when employed in a post–civil war context. More specifically, critics of these institutions suggest that when they are used as a means of ending civil wars, the choice is often “between reforms to promote democracy versus efforts to secure peace.”¹² Since the motivating factor in the construction of power-sharing arrangements has been to terminate armed conflict by providing conflict actors with

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¹⁰ Norris 2008.
¹¹ Linder and Bächtiger 2005.
guarantees regarding their future, postwar societies’ ability to make a transition to democracy, according to this view, is necessarily compromised.

Scholars who believe that power sharing and democracy are incompatible emphasize the tension between power sharing’s focus on inclusion and the competitive nature of democratic systems. A number of elements are associated with this argument. First, power-sharing agreements sometimes allocate and guarantee positions in government to elites, and this is thought to short-circuit one of the fundamental virtues of democracy: the ability of voters to make use of elections and hold leaders accountable for the choices they make while in office. 13 Second, power-sharing measures have been posited to function as an institutional barrier to democracy because they are thought to build “wartime divisions into post-war political structures and [provide] a strong incentive for former warring parties to garner political support primarily from their own constituent groups.” 14 Finally, and in contraposition to the point regarding inclusion made above, to the extent that peace agreements distribute state power among contending groups based on their relative strength on the battlefield, power-sharing arrangements may prove exclusionary if they prevent weak or nonwarring parties from participating in government. 15

Each of these criticisms makes a valid point concerning why power sharing may inhibit a given country from attaining an ideal form of democracy with features such as a fully open political system and cross-cutting cleavages among citizens. If postconflict power sharing cannot help to secure some ideal form of democracy (a version of democracy which, we argue below, is highly unlikely to emerge in the post–civil war environment), a Schumpeterian version of this political system still remains a possibility. It is this more modest version of democracy, with its emphasis on the holding of competitive elections, that we believe is both attainable and realistic for states emerging from internal conflict.

Although the critics of power sharing acknowledge that the post–civil war environment is fraught with challenges, we believe that they underestimate the difficulties post–civil war conditions pose for a transition to democracy. It is precisely where these conditions are worst, and where the emergence of democracy is therefore least likely, that power-sharing institutions are most likely to be designed. Seen from this perspective, power-sharing institutions are not an obstacle to the

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14 Jung 2012.
15 Jarstad 2008; Sriram and Zahar 2010.
development of democracy, but rather can help to make the emergence of at least a minimalist form of democracy possible under challenging circumstances.

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE EMERGENCE OF POST–CIVIL WAR DEMOCRACY

Writing in 2007, Nancy Bermeo observed that few of the armed conflicts concluded during the post–World War II period have been followed by the development of democracy. The failure of many post-conflict countries to make a transition to democracy seems puzzling considering that civil war has been characterized as opening a window of opportunity for institutional change, including the potential adoption of democracy. Indeed, of the limited number of empirical studies that have focused on transitions to democracy following civil war, most have found that intrastate conflicts are often followed by democratization, conceptualized in terms of improvements in countries’ Polity scores. Although such changes are important, closer investigation suggests that many of the countries that register these improvements remain on the authoritarian or anocratic dimensions of the Polity spectrum. This finding confirms Bermeo’s central point: it is remarkably difficult for countries that have experienced civil war to make the transition to democracy.

In order to explain why some countries emerging from intrastate conflict find it so challenging to construct democracy, we begin by characterizing the environment actors confront following civil war.

THE POST–CIVIL WAR ENVIRONMENT

Civil wars impose high costs on a society in terms of deaths, displaced populations, and economic losses; it typically takes countries years to recover from the negative effects of such conflicts. These factors make the postconflict environment a particularly difficult one in which to cultivate the emergence of democracy. Social capital, a concept that has been found to aid in transitions to democracy, is likely to be in short supply in states in which groups have recently been killing one another. Civil wars may also reverse or otherwise compromise processes

17 Cortell and Peterson 1999.
18 Wantchekon and Neeman 2002; Fortna 2008; Gurses and Mason 2008.
19 Collier et al. 2003.
20 Paxton 2002.
of modernization linked to the development of democracy. Further, the economic losses associated with civil wars are likely to inhibit the ability of states to make the types of investments in institutions (for example, courts, independent electoral authorities, and bureaucracies) that are necessary to support democracy.

Beyond the negative effects noted above, intrastate conflicts also generate a strong sense of insecurity among the elites of warring groups and their followers. Armed conflicts, particularly those associated with high numbers of deaths, have been found to undermine feelings of “existential security” or the sense that survival can be taken for granted. A case in point is Iraq. Following foreign military intervention in 2003, a civil war emerged that produced “widespread feelings that life [had] become unpredictable and society [was] falling apart.” Research suggests that a sense of existential insecurity can lead to the rejection of out-groups as well as spawn intense feelings of in-group solidarity, neither of which is conducive to the development of democracy.

Complementing this perspective is a growing body of scholarship that highlights the role that security concerns play in the post–civil war context. This work has identified groups in countries emerging from civil war as suffering from threats to their physical, political, economic, and cultural/social security. Actors’ insecurities regarding these issues are exacerbated by concerns regarding the role that the post–civil war state will play “in mediating or influencing the competition by . . . groups for security.” Fearing threats to their survival, followers of rival groups support the efforts of their leaders to gain control of or continue to control the levers of state power in order to minimize the danger posed by an adversary’s potential dominance of state resources. Leaders, in turn, are motivated to either retain or gain state power not only to avoid the potential for retributive violence but also to ensure their own political survival.

The feelings of insecurity characteristic of the post–civil war environment pose obvious problems for the development of democracy. Once a civil war has ended, political institutions must be built anew if social order is to be restored. However, the leaders of groups emerging from civil wars are likely to be particularly reluctant to adopt demo-

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21 Inglehart, Welzel, and Lefes 2009.
22 Dunning 2011.
23 Inglehart, Moaddel, and Tessler 2006, 495.
24 Inglehart and Welzel 2005.
25 Smith 2006.
27 Smith 2006.
democratic institutions. The principal reason for this is that democracy, as Adam Przeworski notes, requires uncertainty in order to function. Rivals must believe that they have a chance of winning elections—but they must also understand that there is a possibility of losing. Such uncertainty, however, is anathema to groups in postwar states, particularly those whose recent experiences of conflict heighten concerns about whether an electoral loss might lead to threats to their physical and/or political survival. In short, adversaries are unlikely to be willing to play by the rules of the democratic game if their wartime experiences lead them to fear that (1) a rival is likely to become stronger following an election that places its hands on the levers of state power; and (2) the rival may then use that authority to weaken or otherwise target those who lose elections.

In light of these concerns, what type of democracy might one reasonably expect rivals to adopt following civil war? We turn to this question next.

Schumpeterian Democracy: The Art of the Possible

Academics have increasingly considered the possibility that one reason a number of countries have failed to make a transition to democracy following civil war is the failure “to fit nascent democratic institutions to the conditions within a given society, as opposed to simply implementing a narrow (just elections) model or an idealized Western-type set of democratic institutions (secular law, centralized government, all-elected officials).” Roland Paris has aptly described the pitfalls associated with the failure to match models of democracy to the conditions that prevail in postconflict societies. He notes that efforts to install liberal democracies in post–civil war countries during the 1990s often stimulated higher levels of societal competition in states ill-equipped to contain such tension within peaceful bounds. The result of this mismatch has been, in many instances, a failure of democracy to take hold and the reemergence of armed conflict.

These observations suggest that democracy will have the best chance of emerging in a post–civil war environment if the institutions that are adopted are ones that correspond with the conditions characteristic of that setting. Although scholarship on this issue is limited, work by Leonard Wantchekon advances the proposition that “the minimalist and Schumpeterian conception of democracy might be extremely

29 Goldstone 2011.
relevant in a civil war-torn society.” 31 In an environment he describes as dominated by security concerns and a competition for political supremacy, Wantchekon characterizes post–civil war democracy as “a tool for elite cooperation in the process of creating political order.” 32

We concur with Wantchekon’s assessment that the principal goal of rivals emerging from civil war is to adopt a set of rules that enhance their sense of security. The form of democracy most likely to fit with these objectives is the Schumpeterian version. Schumpeter’s work characterizes democracy in the following terms: “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” 33 Under this definition, countries in which there exists “free competition for a free vote” are designated as democratic. 34

Schumpeter’s minimalist understanding of democracy stands in sharp contrast to broader definitions that highlight the importance of citizen participation and the responsiveness of government. Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy is representative of the more ambitious understanding of democracy as it requires institutional guarantees such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and the freedom to form groups. 35 Similarly, Freedom House’s annual measures of the level of democracy around the world rely on an expansive definition of democracy that takes into account factors reflective of citizens’ political rights (such as voting and joining organizations) and civil liberties (including freedom of expression and individual autonomy). 36

Following civil war, we believe that adversaries are most likely to favor Schumpeter’s model of democracy, as it calls for competition based solely on the procedure by which a government is chosen rather than on often highly contested criteria such as government responsiveness to citizens or civil participation in government. 37 The elitist nature of Schumpeterian democracy also serves to assuage groups’ concerns about the potential for instability and related security concerns by conceptualizing democracy as a mechanism for competition among leaders, not among members of society at large. Accordingly, when assess-

31 Wantchekon 2004, 18.
32 Wantchekon 2004, 18.
33 Schumpeter 1976, 260.
34 Schumpeter 1976, 271.
36 Freedom House 2012. Our description of the different measures of democracy is based on the discussion appearing in Bernhagen 2009.
37 Hadenius and Teorell 2005.
ing the likelihood of democracy emerging after civil war, the version of
democracy we employ is the one that we believe is most likely to pro-
vide postconflict populations with a sense of security—the minimalist
or Schumpeterian model of democracy.

**Power Sharing and Postconflict Democracy**

Schumpeterian democracy may represent the art of the possible in the
post–civil war environment, but it is doubtful that even this version of
democracy will emerge in the absence of measures designed to provide
groups with guarantees regarding their security and other vital inter-
ests. Although minimalist in form, Schumpeterian democracy entails
elections and electoral contests, which involve uncertainty. Accord-
ingly, if adversaries are to consider adopting democracy, they will need
to be reassured that “elections are not all-or-nothing propositions.”

Civil war rivals require some guarantee that if they lose an election
their opponent will not be able to use the powers of the state to target
them. In the section below we consider the role that power-sharing
institutions can play in encouraging the emergence of democracy fol-
lowing intrastate war.

**How Power Sharing Encourages the Adoption of Democracy after Civil War**

Power sharing itself is not inherently democratic. In fact, most ele-
ments of power sharing do not require democracy to function. Politic-
ical power sharing, for example, may be apparent in the context of a
nondemocratic state if leaders commit themselves to proportionality
in the appointment of the representatives of different groups to posi-
tions of authority within government. Similarly, military power shar-
ing in which government and rebel armies are integrated into a single,
cohesive unit does not require democracy. As final examples of power
sharing in a nondemocratic context, the Soviet Union, along with
other nondemocratic states such as Sudan, at times adopted forms of
territorial power sharing through the practice of providing autonomy
to regionally concentrated ethnic groups.

From this perspective, it is not our argument that the adoption of
power sharing itself establishes a minimalist democracy. Instead, we
develop the claim that power-sharing institutions provide groups with

38 Bermeo 2003, 165.
39 Licklider 2014.
40 Roeder 2007.
the assurances necessary to encourage them to play by the electoral rules of the game and to abide by the norms of a democratic system. The presence of the elite representatives of rival groups at the political center, for example, enables groups to monitor legislation and, potentially, to veto measures that may be harmful to their interests. The integration of troops from rival entities into the state’s security forces provides a method of checking any single group’s ability to use the state’s coercive forces to harm another. Although these guarantees do not eliminate all of the uncertainty associated with elections, they do mean that antagonists should no longer perceive the outcomes of elections in life-or-death terms.

Burundi serves as a relevant example. Since its independence in 1961, both the minority Tutsi and the majority Hutu have at times controlled the government. Each has also used the powers of the state to target its rivals; a mass killing of Hutus by the Tutsi-dominated army took place in 1972 and mass killings of Tutsis by Hutus occurred in 1993. Agreements ending Burundi’s most recent conflict have sought to address the fears this violence has generated by mandating a variety of rules for interethnic power sharing, including the political and military power-sharing mechanisms outlined above. These have been followed by other measures seeking further to minimize uncertainty. A case in point concerns a power-sharing rule that specifies that the country’s senate must consist of an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi representatives. The predictability of this outcome was enhanced via an article in the 2005 constitution that specified a mechanism to correct imbalances if elections did not produce the desired outcome.41 Once those measures were in place, Burundi made the transition to democracy with elections held later that year for both the parliament and the presidency.

Power-sharing institutions can also help to facilitate the emergence of democracy in the post–civil war state by providing a set of shared rules that can serve as the basis for constructing the rule of law. There is a growing consensus among scholars that the rule of law is a necessary precondition for the development of democracy. As Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin point out, although many countries associated with the third wave of democratization (that began in 1974) introduced competitive elections, democracy failed to take hold because they lacked the basic institutions of the modern state such as the rule of law.42 Drawing on a historical example, Roberto Toscano emphasizes that,

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41 Lemarchand 2006.
42 Rose and Shin 2001.
In the West, . . . we tend to make the mistake of reversing the historical and logical sequence between the rule of law and democracy. We seem to have forgotten that democracy has been the late fruit of a long and difficult process of rule-setting and power limitation. The Magna Carta of 1215 was definitely not a democratic document, but a pact between a sovereign and a group of what today we would call “warlords,” aimed at reducing conflict through the common acceptance of rules and limitations. . . . Democracy comes after the law and on the basis of shared rules, not vice versa.43

Constructed as part of a process of ending civil wars, power-sharing institutions stipulate how the bases of governmental power are to be divided among a particular group of actors. By allocating certain powers to specified actors, power-sharing arrangements perform a rule of law-like function by delimiting the powers of those who govern. Although the act of distributing power in this fashion may strike some as crude, agreements for the sharing of power provide a degree of clarity and transparency regarding the exercise of authority that is likely to have been lacking in many pre–civil war states. Power-sharing institutions themselves may not be inherently democratic, but they can serve to help construct a political order upon which democracy may be built.

Finally, the use of multiple forms of power sharing is more likely to reassure groups that their security concerns will be addressed in the postconflict setting; if one form of power sharing fails, other forms can be relied on to help check the power of rival groups. It is thus our expectation that conflicts that end with actors agreeing to adopt multiple forms of power sharing will be the ones most likely to see democracy emerge following the end of the war.

PARALLELS TO THE EXISTING DEMOCRATIZATION LITERATURE

Our focus on the role of power sharing in facilitating a transition to minimalist democracy parallels earlier research concerned with the potential for pacts to expedite a peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The literature on democratizing pacts does not focus solely on states experiencing civil war, but instead is concerned with all types of strategic interactions between government and the opposition. Scholars who have contributed to this literature view the pacts produced as a result of bargaining between government and opposition as roadmaps for democratization.44

43 Toscano et al. 2012, 3.
44 Representative studies that consider democratization as a function of interactions between government and opposition include Rustow 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Wood 2001; and Yashar 1997.
For the purposes of this study, what is notable about this literature is the frequent suggestion that pacts facilitate democratization by reassuring those who are losing authority as a result of the transition. This focus on providing a form of security guarantee is apparent in Terry Lynn Karl’s characterization of a pact as an agreement that serves to “. . . define the rules of governance on the basis of mutual guarantees of the ‘vital interests’ of those involved.”45 Similarly, Frances Hagopian characterizes Latin American pacts as reassuring stakeholders that their core interests will not be threatened:

. . . pacts can calm military (as well as civilian) fears and dissuade the military from retaking the reins of government by assuring the masses will not be mobilized. . . . By offering concessions to these and other civilian elites who are either lukewarm about democracy or have contributed to its breakdown, it is hoped that pacts can diminish the appeal of military rule and stimulate support for the democratic project.46

In this sense, there is a parallel between post–civil war power-sharing agreements and pacted bargains: each seeks to facilitate transition by addressing the concerns of those most likely to oppose change.

A second commonality between the literature concerning post–civil war power sharing and studies focusing on pacts is a shared skepticism that the political system that emerges from this process will be fully democratic. This work suggests that the emphasis on providing reassurances to stakeholders has the effect of limiting democratic governance from reaching its full potential. Karl takes this perspective to its most extreme, describing pacts as “anti-democratic mechanisms” that serve to remove the influence of mass actors and “delineate the extent to which all actors can participate or wield power in the future.”47

This criticism, it should be noted, resonates with the indictments that critics have leveled in recent years against post–civil war forms of power sharing.

We share the view articulated within this literature that negotiated settlements may facilitate a peaceful political transition by protecting the interests of stakeholders in the politics of the state. Where we part company with the studies concerning pacts is their criticisms of the democracy that develops as a function of these negotiated agreements. We believe that limited democracy, at least in the period immediately following negotiations, may be the most realistic form of governance.

45 Karl 1990, 9.
46 Hagopian 1990, 150.
47 Karl 1990, 12.
If agreements to devise varied forms of power sharing facilitate the emergence of a minimalist form of democracy following the end of civil wars, why are there notable instances of post–civil war states, such as Angola and Tajikistan, in which democracy failed to develop in the aftermath of an agreement to share power among rivals? Should one interpret these cases, and others like them, to suggest that power sharing has a negative effect on the development of democracy after civil war?

One factor that makes it difficult to answer these questions is that actors in countries emerging from civil war do not randomly adopt power-sharing arrangements. We believe that civil war adversaries will prove most likely to agree to multiple forms of power sharing as a means of ending particularly difficult conflicts. Generally speaking, scholars have characterized as difficult, serious, or intractable those civil wars that are lengthy, produce large numbers of casualties, and involve cycles of repeated violence among the parties to the conflict.48

There are two principal reasons to expect that difficult civil wars will end with adversaries agreeing to engage in power sharing. First, once opponents come to believe that they are locked in an unwinnable conflict, they should become more willing to consider alternative means of ending the war.49 As Michael Grieg and Patrick Regan observe, “[W]hen conflict imposes unacceptably painful costs upon both sides such that neither side can unilaterally impose a settlement, disputants become motivated to change the status quo by moving toward a compromise outcome.”50 In the context of civil wars, such compromise outcomes have been found to take the form of power-sharing arrangements.

Second, difficult civil wars are likely to produce more marked feelings of insecurity on the part of the parties to the conflict. This sense of insecurity is a function of the higher costs associated with such conflicts as well as the realization that, if not checked in some fashion, a rival with sufficient power to engage and match one’s forces in a protracted conflict may well be able to inflict further harm once a war is over. Strong feelings of insecurity should motivate adversaries to agree to multiple forms of power-sharing measures as a means of limiting the

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48 Fortna 2008; Melander 2009; DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen 2011; World Bank 2011.
49 Mason and Fett 1996.
50 Greig and Regan 2008, 761.
ability of contending groups to threaten their security in the post–civil war environment.

One objection that might be raised regarding our emphasis on multiple forms of power sharing is that it treats each of the four forms—political, military, territorial, and economic—as being of equal importance in terms of its effect in easing rival groups’ security fears and thus facilitating the emergence of democracy. We do not employ any sort of ranking scheme for, or otherwise distinguish among, the four types of power sharing precisely because we believe that some forms of power sharing will prove more reassuring in certain conflict contexts than others. Territorial power sharing, for example, is only likely to help assuage the fears of groups that are geographically concentrated in parts of the country and thus can take advantage of the use of this measure. Adversaries, in our view, will choose to make use of the power-sharing measures that best address their security concerns. That said, it is our contention that the larger the number of these different types of power sharing that civil war rivals employ, the more secure they will feel.

Pulling it all together: difficult conflicts, power sharing, and postconflict democracy

We have argued that, all other things being equal, democracy is less likely to emerge following difficult civil wars. However, such conflicts should have the effect of persuading adversaries to agree to settlements that call for diverse forms of power sharing as a means of ending their conflicts. As we note above, marked security concerns are associated with both the process of ending a civil war and that of transitioning to democracy. This suggests that the decision by wartime rivals to engage in power sharing and the decision regarding whether or not to adopt democracy may be interrelated. If power sharing is most likely to be adopted under conditions that make it difficult for democracy to emerge after civil war, the failure to take this potential source of bias into account could lead us to miss the positive effect power-sharing institutions have on the development of democracy. We address this possibility below.

Our first effort to assess the potential impact that power-sharing institutions have on the emergence of postconflict democracy consists of

51 Another way of putting this is that we face a potential selection-effect problem in which unobserved factors—that is, the sense of insecurity that we have argued affects civil war adversaries’ choices—are correlated with both the treatment (power sharing) and the outcome (the onset of democracy).
Table 2 lists all civil wars fought and ended during the period from 1945 to the end of 2006. Focusing only on those years following the end of a conflict and during which the country remained at peace, the results of the cross-tabulation indicate that post–civil war democracy has a higher likelihood of emerging in those instances in which adversaries agree to two or more forms of power sharing (17.1 percent) versus those in which actors agree to zero or only one such provision (3.5 percent).

While these results are promising, they cannot be considered definitive given the absence of control variables. We therefore turn to the use of a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model. This model simultaneously solves two equations of univariate probit models—the binary decision by civil war adversaries regarding whether or not to enter into a power-sharing arrangement (the selection equation) and the binary outcome of the adoption of democracy (the outcome equation). The bivariate probit model assumes that the random error terms in the equations are jointly normally distributed and have a correlation coefficient equal to $\rho$. If the error terms in the selection and outcome equations are correlated, the model corrects for it; we can then attribute any remaining difference in the emergence of democracy between countries that employ various forms of power sharing and those that do not to the effect of power sharing. The model, which is estimated by full-information maximum-likelihood estimation, allows for all possible combinations of the dependent variables: multiple forms of power sharing and democracy.

Equations 1 and 2 provide the formal specification of the model. For the selection equation

$$\pi_{ij1}^* = X_{ij1} \beta_1 + \epsilon_{ij1} : \pi_{ij1} = 1, \text{ if } \pi_{ij1}^* > 0,$$

meaning that the parties agree to multiple forms of power sharing; 0 otherwise. For the outcome equation

$$\pi_{ij2}^* = X_{ij2} \beta_2 + \pi_{ij1} \gamma + \epsilon_{ij2} : \pi_{ij2} = 1, \text{ if } \pi_{ij2}^* > 0,$$

signifying that a transition to democracy takes place; 0 otherwise.

We run the bivariate probit model using a panel time-series data set consisting of all cases of civil wars fought and ended during the period from 1945 through the end of 2006. The unit of analysis is the
### Table 2
**Cross-Tabulation: Power Sharing and the Emergence of Postconflict Democracy, 1945–2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multiple Forms of Power Sharing</th>
<th>Zero or One Forms of Power Sharing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Onset of Democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi (2005); Cambodia (1991); Colombia (1958); Costa Rica (1948); Djibouti (1994); DRC&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (2003); El Salvador (1992); Georgia (1994) Guatemala (1996) Guinea Bissau (1998); India (1948); Indonesia (2005); Lebanon (1958 and 1990); Liberia (1996 and 2003); Mali (1995); Moldova (1992); Mozambique (1992); Nicaragua (1989); Philippines (1996); Russia (1996); Sierra Leone (2001); South Africa (1994); Zimbabwe (1979)</td>
<td>Argentina (1955); Bolivia (1952); Congo Republic (1994); Croatia (1995); Cyprus (1964 and 1974); Dominican Republic (1965); Ethiopia (1991); Greece (1949); India (1993); Iran (1984); Nigeria (1970); Pakistan (1977); Paraguay (1947); Peru (1997); Philippines (1954); Romania (1989) Sri Lanka (1971, 2002); Turkey (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 (17.1%)</td>
<td>20 (3.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Onset of Democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (1994 and 2002); Azerbaijain (1994); Chad (1988, 2002); Iraq (1970); Laos (1975); Myanmar (1995); Rwanda (1994); Sudan (1972 and 2005); Tajikistan (1997); North Yemen (1970)</td>
<td>Algeria (1962 and 2005); Burundi (1969, 1972, 1988); Cambodia (1975); China (1949, 1959, 1968); Congo Republic (1999, 2003); Croatia (1992); Cuba (1959); DRC&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1965, 1967, 1978); Indonesia (1950, 1962); Iraq (1959, 1975, 1991); Jordan (1971); Morocco (1991); Nicaragua (1979); Nigeria (1984); Papua New Guinea (1998); Pakistan (2006); Rwanda (1964); Uganda (1966 and 2006); Vietnnam (1975); Yemen (1994); North Yemen (1948); South Yemen (1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121 (82.9%)</td>
<td>554 (96.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chi<sup>2</sup> (1) = 36.9525; Pr = 0.000**

<sup>a</sup> Dates in parentheses correspond to years in which that country’s civil war(s) ended. The onset of democracy, if any occurred, is measured in the first year following a war’s end in which the country meets the definition of democracy employed in this study. Analysis focuses only on the years during which the countries remain at peace.

<sup>b</sup> Democratic Republic of the Congo.
post–civil war country year; we focus only on those years following the end of a conflict and during which the country remains at peace. When a country makes a transition to democracy, we drop the subsequent years from the analysis. In those cases in which a country experiences more than one civil war, we analyze the years following the end of each conflict.

The power-sharing or selection equation in the bottom half of the bivariate probit models that appear in Table 3 focuses on factors that affect the decision by civil war adversaries regarding whether or not to undertake power sharing. Multiple forms of power sharing, the dependent variable in the selection equation, is a dichotomous indicator, coded 1 if a civil war settlement calls for two or more of the types of power sharing discussed above and 0 otherwise.53 We expect that the more difficult a civil war is, the greater the odds are that adversaries will agree to various forms of power sharing as a means of ending the conflict. We account for the difficulty of a civil war by using measures for war duration, with long conflicts indicative of deadlock; whether or not the adversaries have engaged in a previous civil war with one another; and whether or not mediation was attempted in the effort to end the civil war.54 We anticipate a positive association between each of these variables and the likelihood that actors will opt for power sharing.

A number of other variables also appear as part of the selection equation of the model. Because previous research has found a positive association between poverty and the use of power sharing as a means of ending civil war, we employ gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a control.55 We also include relative rebel strength as a control measure, based on research by Stephen Gent that finds that a power-sharing arrangement becomes more likely as the military power of a rebel group increases relative to that of the government forces.56 Reflecting the fact that the end of the Cold War saw new pressures being brought to bear on civil war rivals to end their conflicts, a factor likely to have an influence on the increased use of power sharing, we also employ a variable that indicates whether a civil war ended during the post–Cold War period. In order to control for time dependence, we add a count variable, labeled $t$, noting the number of years that have passed since the settlement of the civil war, the square of that variable, and its cube.57

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53 Hartzell and Hoddie 2014. Further information regarding the variables employed in the model appears in the supplementary material, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000306.
54 Previous research has identified difficult civil wars as having the highest likelihood of attracting the involvement of mediators. See, for example, Mellin and Svensson 2009.
55 Wucherpfennig 2011.
56 Gent 2011.
57 Carter and Signorino 2010.
Finally, in order to identify the model, we also employ different variables as exclusion restrictions. The exclusion restriction in model 1 of Table 3 is an indicator for linguistic fractionalization. Scholars have suggested that conflicts in which societies are divided along identity lines, that is, ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, are among the most challenging to resolve. It is our expectation that rivals involved in wars characterized by high levels of linguistic fractionalization should demonstrate a willingness to construct varied forms of power sharing as a means of ending these difficult conflicts. However, empirical work by Mark Gasiorowski, Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, and Wolfgang Merkel and Brigitte Weiffen, and a review of numerous studies on this topic by Michael Coppedge indicate that no relationship exists between linguistic fractionalization and the transition to democracy, thus making this variable a reasonable choice as an exclusion restriction. In model 2 of Table 3 we employ an indicator for exports as a percentage of GDP as an alternative exclusion restriction. Our rationale for using this variable is that exports contribute significantly to the government revenue base in many developing countries through the taxes that governments impose on them. It is our expectation that governments in countries with low scores on this indicator face constraints on their ability to finance extended civil wars and, as a consequence, are more likely to agree to share power with rebel groups as a means of bringing the conflict to an end. Conversely, we have no reason to expect that a country’s level of dependence on external trade will have an impact on the likelihood that it will make a transition to democracy in the wake of civil war. Although some scholarship suggests that countries that have high levels of reliance on external trade will experience an expansion of a middle class that subsequently presses for an end to authoritarianism, this scenario hardly seems relevant to the aftermath of a civil war.

The second or outcome equation in the bivariate probit analysis, which appears in the top half of the models in Table 3, centers on the

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58 An exclusion restriction is a regressor that is included in the selection equation but omitted from the outcome equation and which is considered to be an instrumental variable.
60 Gasiorowski 1995; Fish and Kroenig 2006; Coppedge 2012; Merkel and Weiffen 2012. We employ linguistic fractionalization as a measure of diversity because of the wide range of evidence supporting its lack of impact on the transition to democracy. It is worth noting that Fish and Kroenig find that neither measures of linguistic, ethnic, and religious fractionalization nor measures of polarization affect democratization.
61 Piermartini 2004. Revenues from taxes on exports are likely to be particularly important in countries where civil war limits the ability of governments to collect other types of taxes.
62 Bhagwati 2002.
transition to *minimalist democracy*. We employ Jay Ulfelder and Michael Lustik’s dichotomous measure of democracy in this study. They categorize regimes as democracies when “leaders who rule are chosen through competitive elections in which most of the adult population is allowed to participate and vote.” Ulfelder and Lustik rely on two measures from the Polity data set in order to determine whether a case is consistent with this definition. First, a country must achieve a score of six or higher on Polity’s executive recruitment measure. This is indicative of a state in which elections for the chief executive are competitive, even if they are not understood to be fully free and fair. Second, a state must receive a score of three or higher on the Polity competitiveness of participation measure, indicating that a government “... does not extensively or systematically limit representation.” Only states that reach these required thresholds on both indicators are identified as democracies. We use this indicator, rather than a scalar measure, given our interest in “moments of qualitative transformation, rather than incremental change.”

The dichotomous variable for multiple forms of power sharing is our central explanatory variable in the second or outcome equation of the model. The inclusion of this variable in the democracy equation makes this a recursive model. We expect this variable to be positively associated with the emergence of post–civil war democracy. Because we believe that civil war adversaries emerging from particularly difficult civil wars will be less likely to make a transition to democracy than actors emerging from less intractable conflicts, we also include our central measures of civil war difficulty—war duration, previous civil war, and mediation—in this section of the model. We anticipate a negative association between each of these variables and the onset of democracy in the postconflict state. Additional variables in the outcome equation are included on the basis of previous scholarship on democratization. We expect that those countries with higher levels of GDP per capita, those with previous democratic experience, those to which peacekeeping operations are deployed, and those that ended their wars in the post–Cold War

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63 Ulfelder and Lustik 2007, 353. The authors emphasize that their definition is consistent with a Schumpeterian form of democracy: “...we follow Schumpeter (1942) and Huntington (1991: 5–13), among others, and adopt an approach that emphasizes the procedure by which a government is chosen, rather than the apparent sources of that government’s legitimacy, or the ends towards which it works.”

64 Ulfelder and Lustik 2007, 354.


66 Ulfelder and Lustik 2007, 353.

67 To be clear, we do not believe that mediators act in a manner that discourages the emergence of democracy. Rather, the fact that mediators tend to become involved in the most difficult conflicts lessens the likelihood that they will succeed in achieving this goal.
period should have a higher likelihood of making a transition to democracy. The three count variables—$t$, $t^2$, and $t^3$—that control for time dependence also appear as part of the outcome equation.

Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3 present the results of this analysis. Focusing first on model 1, the Wald test indicates that $\rho \neq 0$, suggesting that since bias is a problem for the sample of countries we analyze, the bivariate probit model is the appropriate model specification. In addition, the negative estimated value of $\rho$ indicates that while factors such as the feelings of insecurity that we posit are associated with difficult conflicts enhance the odds that rivals will adopt power sharing, they also decrease the potential that democracy will be adopted following such conflicts.

The results for the selection and outcome equations of model 1 provide detailed evidence for the claims made above. All of the variables we include in the selection equation of the model have the anticipated effects on the design of power-sharing agreements. All three of the indicators associated with the difficulty of the conflict (war duration, previous civil war, and mediation) are positively signed, although the mediation variable does not prove to be statistically significant. The result associated with the mediation variable suggests that although mediators may seek to promote the use of power sharing as a means of ending conflicts, they do not necessarily press parties to agree to arrangements that call for multiple forms of power sharing. We also find that adversaries have been more apt to sign on to power-sharing agreements in the post–Cold War period and that the wealthier a country is the lower the odds that rivals will agree to power sharing. In addition, although positively signed, the indicator for relative rebel strength is not significant. Finally, we find that linguistic fractionalization, our exclusion restriction in this model, has the anticipated effect; conflicts characterized by higher levels of linguistic fractionalization have a higher likelihood of seeing the parties to the conflict agree to varied forms of power sharing as a means of ending the conflict.

The results for the outcome equation of model 1 support our claim regarding the positive effect that a variety of forms of power sharing has on the emergence of minimalist democracy. The coefficient associated with the power-sharing variable is positively signed and significant at the $p<.001$ level. We also find that previous experience with democracy, higher levels of GDP per capita, and the presence of a peacekeeping
### Table 3
**Bivariate Probit: Multiple Forms of Power Sharing and Democracy Following Civil War, 1945–2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equation Predicting Minimalist Democracy</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Forms of Power Sharing</td>
<td>2.219 (0.502)**</td>
<td>2.316 (0.509)**</td>
<td>0.336 (1.396)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
<td>0.585 (0.329)*</td>
<td>0.210 (0.323)</td>
<td>0.280 (0.388)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Duration (logged)</td>
<td>−0.037 (0.064)</td>
<td>−0.051 (0.067)</td>
<td>−0.040 (0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Civil War</td>
<td>−0.257 (0.376)</td>
<td>−0.221 (0.336)</td>
<td>0.397 (0.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>−0.493 (0.307)</td>
<td>−0.426 (0.333)</td>
<td>−0.119 (0.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Democracy</td>
<td>0.936 (0.331)***</td>
<td>0.925 (0.345)***</td>
<td>1.093 (0.363)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged, lagged)</td>
<td>0.511 (0.179)***</td>
<td>0.609 (0.183)***</td>
<td>0.308 (0.273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post–Cold War</td>
<td>−0.073 (0.343)</td>
<td>−0.335 (0.381)</td>
<td>0.467 (0.547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t)</td>
<td>−0.168 (0.080)**</td>
<td>−0.198 (0.085)**</td>
<td>−0.214 (0.084)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t^2)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t^3)</td>
<td>−0.042 (0.088)</td>
<td>−0.056 (0.099)</td>
<td>−0.093 (0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−5.169 (1.381)***</td>
<td>−5.538 (1.393)***</td>
<td>−3.477 (2.000)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equation Predicting Multiple Forms of Power Sharing</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Duration (logged)</td>
<td>0.296 (0.122)**</td>
<td>0.312 (0.148)**</td>
<td>0.272 (0.191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Civil War</td>
<td>1.653 (0.639)***</td>
<td>1.568 (0.635)***</td>
<td>2.563 (0.835)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>0.559 (0.478)</td>
<td>0.585 (0.513)</td>
<td>−0.335 (0.596)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged, lagged)</td>
<td>−0.817 (0.364)***</td>
<td>−0.866 (0.338)***</td>
<td>−1.945 (0.587)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Rebel Strength</td>
<td>0.374 (0.496)</td>
<td>0.378 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.876 (0.655)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post–Cold War</td>
<td>1.384 (0.550)**</td>
<td>1.986 (0.673)***</td>
<td>1.870 (0.634)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Fractionalization</td>
<td>1.308 (0.745)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports as % of GDP</td>
<td>−0.487 (0.216)***</td>
<td>−1.161 (0.509)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiated Settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.144 (0.788)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Victory</td>
<td></td>
<td>−4.545 (1.407)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t)</td>
<td>−0.153 (0.099)</td>
<td>−0.157 (0.094)*</td>
<td>−0.219 (0.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t^2)</td>
<td>0.014 (0.007)*</td>
<td>0.015 (0.007)***</td>
<td>0.027 (0.015)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t^3)</td>
<td>−0.273 (0.144)*</td>
<td>−0.292 (0.148)**</td>
<td>−0.499 (0.321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.707 (2.345)***</td>
<td>4.856 (2.291)***</td>
<td>17.002 (4.305)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>570</th>
<th>506</th>
<th>506</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudo Likelihood</td>
<td>−245.539</td>
<td>−222.757</td>
<td>−180.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi²</td>
<td>6.420</td>
<td>7.347</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; Chi²</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>−0.832 (0.145)</td>
<td>−0.830 (0.137)</td>
<td>0.432 (1.022)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** \(p < 0.01\), ** \(p < 0.05\), * \(p < 0.10\) (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering over country.
operation in the country have a positive and significant effect on post-
conflict democracy. Finally, although they are not statistically signifi-
cant, the measures associated with the difficulty of a conflict—duration,
previous civil war, and mediation—are all negatively signed, suggesting
that these factors have an inhibiting influence on the emergence of
democracy.69

Model 2 serves as a test of the robustness of our results.70 The model
is identical to model 1 except that in this instance we employ exports
as percentage of GDP as an exclusion restriction. The results in this case
are similar to those we report for model 1. The same variables prove
significant and are signed as expected in the selection and outcome
equations of model 2. Our exclusion restriction of exports as a percent-
age of GDP has the anticipated effect in the selection equation of the
model.71

For model 1, the predicted probability that a country will make a
transition to democracy is .4 percent when all of the continuous vari-
ables are set at their mean values and the dichotomous variables are set
at their modal values (the modal value for the power-sharing variable
is 0). The predicted probability rises to 33.33 percent when the value
for the power-sharing variable is set to 1. In the case of model 2, the
predicted probability of a country making a transition to democracy
rises from .27 percent to 31.82 percent when the indicator for power
sharing is changed from 0 to 1.

Given a tendency in the civil war literature to link forms of war ter-
mination with power sharing, we undertake an additional robustness
test in model 3 by adding indicators for two types of war termination,
negotiated settlement and military victory, to model 2.72 Military vic-

69 Although we do not present the results here, we also tested a version of model 1 in which, us-
ing the nonlinearity of the bivariate normality assumption as an identifying condition, we include
linguistic fractionalization in the outcome equation of the model. The variable did not prove to have a
statistically significant effect on the onset of minimalist democracy.
70 We also ran a series of other robustness tests in addition to those reported here. We include each
of the following indicators in the selection equation of the model: a measure of mountainous terrain in
the expectation that rebels who have access to areas from which they can safely wage a war against the
government will be less inclined to agree to extensive power sharing; a measure for foreign aid (logged)
that we expect will contribute to the government’s resources and ability to prosecute the conflict, thus
making it less inclined to agree to share power with the rebels; and a variable for the issues at stake
in the conflict that is scored 1 for identity conflicts based on an expectation that identity-based wars
should be more difficult to resolve. The first two variables prove to be negatively signed as expected;
the third is positively signed as anticipated. None of the variables are statistically significant and none
have any substantive effects on the results of our analysis.
71 Employing the nonlinearity of the bivariate normality assumption as an identifying condition,
we include the indicator for exports as a percentage of GDP in the outcome equation of the model. We
find that it does not prove a statistically significant predictor of the onset of Schumpeterian democracy.
72 The reference category is negotiated truces.
tories have been assumed to be negatively associated with power sharing, as victors are not thought to have any incentive to share power with the rivals they have vanquished. Wars that end via negotiations, on the other hand, are thought to be positively associated with the design of power-sharing agreements as governments are called upon to make concessions to rebel groups they have been unable to defeat militarily. As the results for the selection equation of model 3 make clear, we find that although military victories have the anticipated effect on the construction of power-sharing agreements, negotiated settlements do not; the coefficient for the negotiated settlement variable is positively signed but fails to attain statistical significance. Turning to the outcome equation of the model, we find that, although positively signed, the indicator for multiple forms of power sharing is no longer significant once we add the two forms of war termination to the selection equation of the model.

Two points bear noting with respect to model 3. First, we believe that including the types of war termination in the bivariate probit analysis leads to a misspecification of the model. Negotiated settlements have often been used as a rough proxy for stalemated conflicts. However, the first stage of our model already includes a number of variables that are meant more precisely to capture features associated with intractable or difficult conflicts. Including those variables as well as the forms of war termination in our model introduces potential problems of collinearity. Additionally, including the forms of war termination in the selection equation may produce other types of bias. Madhav Joshi’s observation that “rivals are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement when there are . . . institutional mechanisms (that is, power-sharing institutions) to resolve the credible commitment problems that would make them reluctant to agree to a settlement,” for example, suggests that there is a potential for bias in the form of reverse causality.

Second, we are not aware of any argument that links either war termination through negotiated settlement or military victory to the particular dependent variable we are interested in, that is, the adoption of multiple forms of power-sharing. Previous work on negotiated settlements, for example, has found that form of war termination to be associated with as few as zero types of power sharing measures and as many as four. The range of power-sharing arrangements associated with negotiated settlements suggests that not all negotiated settlements are

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73 Gurses and Mason 2008.
74 Joshi 2010, 832.
75 Hartzell and Hoddie 2007.
created equal. Lacking both a theory that associates war termination types with the diversified nature of power-sharing arrangements as well as measures that capture potential differences among negotiated settlements and military victories, we believe it is appropriate to avoid including these variables in the model.\footnote{We also run a version of the model in which, relying on the nonlinearity of the bivariate normality assumption as an identifying condition, we add the two war termination types to model 1. In this instance both variables are negatively signed and statistically significant in the selection equation of the model (although negotiated settlement only at the p<.1 level) and our power-sharing variable is positively signed and statistically significant at the p<.001 level in the outcome equation of the model. We are skeptical about the appropriateness of this model and the results it produces, however, given that the coefficient of -1 associated with rho suggests that the model suffers from identification problems.}

**Discussion and Conclusion**

We began this study by noting that although the international community has expended considerable effort and resources to assist countries emerging from civil war to make the transition to democracy, only slightly more than half of the countries in question managed to do so in the decade following the end of armed conflict. We believe that these odds could be improved if more consideration were given to the “art of the possible” following civil wars. This entails recognizing that societies emerging from intrastate conflict face numerous challenges, foremost among them feelings of insecurity, which hinder the emergence of democracy. This sense of insecurity can be managed and a transition to democracy made feasible, we contend, through the establishment of power-sharing institutions. Taking into account the possibility that wartime rivals’ decisions regarding whether or not to agree to power sharing and whether or not to adopt democracy are likely to be interrelated, we find empirical support for the argument that the agreement to adopt a variety of forms of power sharing can help to facilitate a transition to democracy. This is an important finding given that previous research has found that power-sharing arrangements help to extend the duration of the peace following civil wars. This suggests, contrary to what other scholars have argued, that civil war adversaries who make use of power sharing need not face an immediate choice between securing the peace and constructing democracy.

One potential limitation associated with our analysis is that we focus on the agreement by conflict parties to engage in multiple forms of power sharing rather than the implementation of these measures. Although information regarding the extent to which adversaries follow through on their power-sharing commitments would likely pro-
vide useful insights regarding power sharing’s effects on postconflict democracy, such data might not shed much light on the transition to democracy that is at the core of this work. We base this conclusion on a hazard analysis of the emergence of democracy over time following the end of civil wars. Our analysis indicates that a democratic transition is most likely to take place in the first two years following the end of a civil war, and that such a transition becomes quite unlikely a decade after a settlement. The fact that there is often a lag involved in implementing power-sharing measures suggests that although settlement implementation may play an important role at other stages of the democratic process, it may not be critical for the transition to democracy.

There are several implications associated with conceptualizing postconflict democratization in terms of the art of the possible. One of these has to do with the particular form of democracy on which we focus. We argue that in an environment in which feelings of insecurity are prevalent, the model of democracy that has the best chance of emerging is the minimalist or Schumpeterian version. Our claim is not that countries emerging from civil war are in some sense less worthy of adopting other models of democracy—that is, liberal—to which they might aspire. Rather, it is that given the opportunity to choose among models of democracy, the elites and the masses in countries emerging from civil war will be most likely to settle on the version of democracy that they believe best minimizes threats to their security, including the threat of the renewal of armed conflict.

Clearly not everyone will feel comfortable with this focus on a regime type that so obviously equates democracy with order and stability. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to indicate that this conception of democracy is one that resonates with the public in countries in which civil wars have been fought. For example, citing Afrobarometer data, Michael Bratton, Gina Lambright, and Robert Sentamu observe that democracy in Uganda has a substantive meaning: it “is a system of government that puts an end to political violence and unites and stabilizes the country.”

None of these points should be taken to suggest that countries in which civil war rivals agree to put power-sharing arrangements in place make the transition to some idealized state of democracy. Our focus on the role power-sharing institutions play in the transition to democracy does not shed light on what role, if any, these measures play where the consolidation of democracy is concerned, for example. In some

77 Results are available from the authors upon request.
instances, countries that agree to power-sharing measures make a transition to democracy only to see an authoritarian regime (re)emerge a few years later (for example, Cambodia). We also do not know whether power sharing facilitates or impedes movement from Schumpeterian democracy to other forms of democracy. An investigation of these types of issues should constitute the next stage of a research agenda on the relationship between civil war and democracy. Although this study is intended to shed light on the factors that have an impact on transitions to democracy following civil war, we still know relatively little about what happens to those minimalist democracies in the years that follow. One thing remains clear, however. Determining what type of democracy, if any, is most likely to emerge in the post–civil war environment, and what factors best facilitate its emergence, is an important step in moving from what is possible to what may be desirable. For, as Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, citing Giovanni Sartori, note: “[W]e must—if we are to be capable of maximizing democracy—first see to it that it is present in its minimal sense.”

Supplementary Material
Supplementary material for this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org.10.1017/S0043887114000306.

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79 Hadenius and Teorell 2005, 11.


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